In democratic societies, the news media are expected to play a role in monitoring governments and corporations where power and wealth are concentrated, and in speaking up for the vulnerable. Past surveys of media professionals indicate that Japanese journalists are aware of these roles and believe they are fulfilling them to some extent.

However, with regard to Japan’s international news coverage, judging from what the country’s major media outlets produce, it must be said that reality falls far short of the ideal for the media described at the outset. To begin with, the primary subjects of international reporting are political and economic elites. In addition, when it comes to coverage of topics such as criminal cases involving diplomatic issues, environmental problems, and international cooperation, news outlets tend to start paying attention after the Japanese or U.S. government has done so, and there is a tendency to echo those governments’ positions in how events are framed. There is extremely little reporting that addresses escalating poverty or widening inequality worldwide. Moreover, information inconvenient for Japanese companies—such as suspected corruption or exploitation abroad—often goes unreported, while there is a tendency to emphasize corporate posturing that appears to contribute to solving global problems, such as activities undertaken in the name of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In war reporting as well, conflicts that attract elite attention—Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine—are covered incessantly day after day, and death tolls are highlighted. Yet there is hardly any mention of the realities of the wars in Yemen and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the number of deaths exceeds those in the former two conflicts—indeed, the existence of these countries is rarely even noted.

Why does this gap between the ideal and reality of journalism arise? This article explores that question by introducing a concept that helps explain it: the “propaganda model.”

Joint press conference by the prime ministers of Japan and India, Tokyo, Japan (Photo: MEAphotogallery / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED])

What is the propaganda model?

To understand the issues in Japan’s international reporting, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s 1988 book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (a Japanese translation is available) offers a useful guide. The book, which examines the United States during the Cold War, has also been interpreted as “manufacturing consent.” Its argument is as follows. In the U.S., freedom of speech and of the press are guaranteed by the Constitution, and therefore speech and reporting are not supposed to be suppressed by obvious censorship or compelled to adopt particular content. Nevertheless, major media outlets tend to focus in unison on the issues that concern political and economic elites, and to echo elite viewpoints in their coverage. Information and dissent that are inconvenient for elites are often excluded. In short, U.S. major media help construct an information environment that is favorable to the government and large corporations, thereby disseminating government and corporate propaganda—in other words, they fit a propaganda model. This is Herman and Chomsky’s claim.

To explain why this phenomenon of “manufacturing consent” arises in the news, Herman and Chomsky propose a mechanism called the “propaganda model.” In this model, there are five “filters” in news production through which information is selected or excluded: (1) the size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media; (2) advertising as the funding/permission mechanism; (3) the sourcing of mass media; (4) “flak” and those who generate it; and (5) anti-communism as a control mechanism.

Summarized briefly: (1) and (2) News production requires capital and operating funds, and to ensure these, content is influenced by economic elites such as media owners, shareholders, and sponsor companies. (3) Because political and economic elites are the main sources for news outlets, the outlets are influenced by them and may cater to them to maintain access. (4) Elites can implement or hint at regulation against coverage they deem “deviant,” and other influential organizations or individuals can barrage outlets with criticism. (5) The presence of a common enemy or a prevailing ideology in society also shapes coverage. Viewed together, the phenomenon of “manufacturing consent” does not stem from elite control, censorship, coercion, or conspiracy per se; rather, it arises from the media’s dependence on elites for funding and sources, and from the alignment of interests between political/economic elites and media owners.

The book applies the propaganda model to foreign affairs. For example, in coverage of wars in other countries, reporting differs depending on whether the victims were attacked by an enemy state or by one’s own country or an allied country. If the perpetrators are enemies, victims are featured prominently as “worthy victims” deserving of sympathy; if one’s own country or allies are responsible, enemy victims are deemed unworthy of sympathy and their suffering is scarcely reported at all.

Since its publication in 1988, the book has gained attention around the world and influenced thinking about the media. But more than 30 years have passed. The Cold War has ended, technology has advanced, and the internet and social media have spread rapidly. Does the propaganda model still fit today’s dramatically different international and information environments? In fact, the model continues to be applied broadly, and a book published in 2018 applies it across many countries in North America, Latin America, and Western Europe.

NHK studio, Hiroshima, Japan (Photo: THINK Global School / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED])

So, does the propaganda model also apply to international reporting in Japan? Below, we simplify the five filters in the model and examine them as follows: First filter: news organizations as corporations; second filter: advertising; third filter: sources; fourth filter: “flak”; fifth filter: common enemies and ideology.

First filter: news organizations as corporations

As in other democracies where press freedom is guaranteed by the constitution, coverage in Japan is dominated by large conglomerates (media conglomerates). Although the spread of the internet and social media has undermined some aspects of news media business models in recent years, the scale of the businesses and capital of conglomerates handling television news and print media remains large. Except for NHK, the public broadcaster funded by license fees, all major news outlets are corporations. Some outlets have shares that are publicly traded.

Operations also reveal these outlets’ identity as elite businesses. Many engage in economic activities beyond the news industry. For example, the Yomiuri Shimbun Group runs a baseball team and an amusement park, while the Asahi Shimbun Company operates in real estate/building management and mail-order sales. Beyond that, at the government-hosted Tokyo 2020 Olympics, many news organizations went beyond reporting and served as partners or sponsors of the event. Some experts’ analyses suggest that this stance influenced coverage.

Leadership appointments also hint at proximity to elites. While most executives at news organizations come from the media industry, some outlets appoint outside directors for managerial advice. For instance, Asahi Broadcasting Group Holdings has outside directors from major companies in gas and stationery/office equipment. There are also executives who have moved beyond the media sphere. For example, Tsuneo Watanabe, former chairman of Yomiuri Shimbun Group Headquarters, is said to have been involved in political maneuvering such as a 2007 grand coalition plan between the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan.

Many individuals at each outlet may be motivated by the journalistic mission of acting as a “watchdog.” Even so, being part of a media conglomerate and operating under a profit orientation can be expected to influence output to a nontrivial degree.

Yomiuri telecasting headquarters, Osaka, Japan (Photo: Mc681 / Wikimedia [CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED])

Second filter: advertising

In 2021, internet ad spending surpassed that on TV and in newspapers, but advertising remains an important revenue source for traditional news organizations. For example, ads account for about 20% of total newspaper revenue, including subscriptions, and occupy around 30% of print space.

In this context, the fear of losing ad revenue creates incentives for outlets to avoid reporting information that would be inconvenient for sponsors. However, it is difficult to obtain evidence of the extent to which such invisible pressure exists and whether outlets capitulate to it. Even so, there are numerous cases in Japan’s international reporting where information seemingly inconvenient for sponsors is not covered.

For instance, in recent years the U.S. government has sought to promote electric vehicles as part of climate policy. The New York Times reported in July 2021 that Toyota had been actively lobbying the U.S. government and its stakeholders to thwart such policies, arguing that Toyota was lagging behind other automakers in EV development. Spurred by that reporting, other U.S. media also focused on Toyota’s lobbying, but Japan’s major media did not. Outlets such as the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun covered Toyota around the same time in their international reporting, but the content presented positive views—such as strong sales. Toyota regularly provides a large volume of ads, ranking first among Japanese companies in advertising and promotion expenses.

In addition, while foreign media report on human rights, corruption, and environmental issues said to involve multiple Japanese companies overseas, Japanese outlets have shown great reluctance to cover such stories—a trend that has been observed. In global health issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous problems with the pharmaceutical industry have been pointed out, yet reporting on issues in that industry has been extremely limited. The problems caused worldwide by alcohol and tobacco also receive little coverage. Notably, manufacturers in pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco all rank among the top spenders on advertising in Japan.

As noted, it is not easy to prove a causal link between an outlet’s unwillingness to scrutinize problems in these industries and the advertising those related companies provide. Other factors, such as ideologies like nationalism discussed below, could also be at play. Nevertheless, given a system in which potential subjects of reporting are also sources of revenue for outlets, it is hard to dismiss the inference that this affects news media.

Neon advertisements in Shibuya, Japan (Photo: Richard Schneider / Flickr [CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED])

Third filter: sources

The elite orientation seen in Japan’s international reporting is also evident in who becomes the subject of coverage. A GNV study (2015–2020) found that in about 57% of international stories, central governments at home or abroad or international organizations were the main subjects. Including non-central government officials and companies brings the figure to 67%. This relates to sourcing as well: guests on news programs and experts quoted in stories are centered on government officials and the like.

For example, classifying the current and past affiliations of the 105 guests who appeared over three months (August–October 2023) on Nippon TV’s Shinsou News shows that 54% were current or former government officials. Given that the wars in Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine dominated program content during this period, many of these were Self-Defense Forces affiliates.

Similar tendencies appear in newspaper coverage. Consider reporting on the armed conflict that erupted in April 2023 in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital. GNV examined two weeks of related Asahi Shimbun coverage from April 16, when the paper first ran stories on the conflict, through April 29, and categorized 119 instances of direct or indirect citations of sources. It found that 87% of citations were government or UN officials. Most related articles did not focus on the conflict itself, but on matters related to Japan, such as the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Sudan. As a result, during the study period 30% of citations came from Japanese government officials, followed by the U.S. government (18%) and UN officials (13%). Perhaps because no reporter entered the field, statements or claims by the Sudanese government (8%), Sudanese opposition forces (4%), and Sudanese civilians—who were the victims (1%)—accounted for only a combined 13% of citations.

Clearly, in Japan’s international reporting the Japanese government and its affiliates are treated as the most important sources. Relying on government sources provides easy access without much effort or cost, but it brings various problems. It can cede judgments about newsworthiness and framing to the government, creating a state of alignment with government concerns and preferences. It also increases the risk that outlets will repeat, without scrutiny, government propaganda and disinformation, thereby helping to spread them. Furthermore, fear of losing access can make outlets reluctant to voice dissent against state policies or stances.

Japan’s UN ambassador speaks to reporters about North Korea, UN Headquarters (Photo: United Nations Photo / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED])

Fourth filter: “flak”

When news organizations take a critical stance toward elites such as state authorities or large corporations, those elites may try to suppress it by launching “flak.” Methods vary widely. State authorities and their affiliates can regulate outlets, up to and including revoking broadcast licenses, or hint at doing so. They can also pressure sponsor companies and big tech firms to hinder news operations and distribution. Beyond government actors, staff at think tanks and research institutes, as well as influential individuals on social media, often barrage outlets deemed “deviant” with “flak.” Such think tank and research staff or influencers are sometimes close to government.

On international affairs, Japanese media do not necessarily often criticize their own government or corporations. Yet they sometimes intensify criticism of foreign and domestic policies related to national security and draw “flak” from elites. For example, it was revealed in March 2023 that in March 2015, then–Prime Minister’s aide Yosuke Isozaki had urged senior officials at the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry to “show a willingness to crack down on outrageous programs” regarding “political fairness” in broadcasting. Also that year, at a study session of younger and mid-ranking lawmakers in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, participating politicians made remarks such as “The best way to chastise the media is for them to lose ad revenue” and “The two newspapers in Okinawa must be crushed.” Some argue that such statements by government-affiliated figures about “cracking down” on the media had a chilling effect.

Governments can also “crack down” on media indirectly. As social media platforms have come to play a major role in news distribution, governments have pressured these companies to restrict distribution or suspend accounts. For instance, internal documents released by Twitter (now X) in 2022–2023—known as the “Twitter Files”—revealed that multiple U.S. government agencies had pressured the company. That pressure included restricting or deleting posts and accounts, and it encompassed articles by news organizations.

X itself can become a target of “flak.” After Elon Musk—critical of the Biden administration—acquired the company (then Twitter) in 2022, government pressure on the company is said to have increased. Claims that disinformation on X rose after Musk’s acquisition have also spurred growing calls to regulate free expression on the platform. Such views have been echoed by some researchers in Japan.

Twitter login screen (Photo: Rawpixel [CC0 1.0 DEED])

Fifth filter: common enemies and ideology

In Western countries, the common enemy is no longer the communist bloc, but who is treated as a “common enemy” changes over time. After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., the George W. Bush administration declared a “war on terror,” and not specific states but a method of violence came to be vilified. In practice, however, particular regimes and forces in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa became the “enemy.” Since 9/11, wars led by the United States have killed 4.5 million people. The Japanese government expressed support for those U.S.-led wars. At the same time, Islam also became a target in some respects, and Japanese reporting showed a tendency to link Islam with violence.

Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has in effect been treated as the “common enemy” among the so-called Western countries, including Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Perhaps as a result, biases stand out in related coverage in Japan. For example, both Russia and Ukraine have used cluster munitions in the war, but in Japanese reporting, criticism of such use is directed only at Russia. There have also been cases where, without evidence or verification, Japanese outlets reported the possibility that Russia was preparing chemical weapons, or suggested that Russia was behind the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage between Russia and Germany. In this way, when a state or force is designated a “common enemy,” news outlets tend to report in a way that fits narratives aligned with “our country” or “our side,” including the West, rather than prioritizing the pursuit of truth.

Even regardless of a “common enemy,” ideologies such as ethnocentrism and nationalism strongly influence international reporting in normal times. They lead to tendencies to downplay problems caused by one’s own government or companies, and to overestimate assistance provided to other countries. The image common in Japanese media that allies like the United States are “countries that do the right thing as democracies” also stems from such ideologies. This is one cause of Japanese outlets repeating, without scrutiny, propaganda and disinformation disseminated by the U.S. government.

U.S. forces occupying part of Syria (Photo: The National Guard / Flickr [CC BY 2.0 DEED])

Does improvement start with individual journalists?

This article has examined Japan’s international reporting through the lens of the propaganda model’s five filters. The tendency of Japanese coverage to align with the concerns and preferences of elites such as the government and large corporations can be interpreted as explainable by the five-filter theory. Needless to say, Japanese media are not entirely failing to act as a “watchdog” in international reporting. They sometimes pursue, through reporting, individuals in Japan’s government and corporations implicated in corruption and other scandals. Nevertheless, in situations where the media should monitor power or question the political and economic systems underlying problems, it is hard to say that Japan’s news outlets fully fulfill their proper “watchdog” role.

Behind reporting that hews to power and wealth lie inter-organizational interests, yet many individual journalists working in news organizations can be said to be complicit unconsciously. Noam Chomsky was interviewed on the propaganda model on a BBC program in 1996. The interviewer challenged the model and insisted he did not self-censor as a journalist. Chomsky replied: “I’m not saying you’re self-censoring. I’m sure you believe every word you say. But if you believed something different, you wouldn’t be sitting where you’re sitting.”

In other words, within news organizations closely tied to elites like state authorities and major corporations, those who hold ideas contrary to power might not even become journalists at major outlets. Even if they do, they face worries about whether programs conceived from such ideas will be approved, whether articles will be published, and whether they will be promoted. As individual journalists read and internalize the atmosphere in their organizations, the mechanisms of the propaganda model—reporting that aligns with power—are maintained and reproduced.

At the same time, depending on the nature of events and the posture of editors, there are opportunities for individual journalists to overcome the influences and constraints described by the propaganda model and to monitor power through reporting. We hope courageous journalists will seize such opportunities and increase reporting that fulfills the proper role of journalism.

Journalist holding a microphone to an interviewee (Photo: Kristin Wolff / Flickr [CC BY 2.0 DEED])

Writer: Virgil Hawkins

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