In 2003, when the United States invaded and occupied Iraq, there were think tanks and their researchers conducting policy research and making recommendations in close proximity to the U.S. government. Most of them supported this war, which risked greatly destabilizing the order in the Middle East. Likewise, when the U.S. government, after 20 years of military intervention following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, moved toward withdrawal in 2021, most think tanks took a position opposing it. These are only two cases, but they illustrate a broader pattern: U.S. think tanks are often noted for tending to support wars in other countries. One study also found that among the 25 most influential think tanks in the U.S., about half receive funding from the arms industry. Is it mere coincidence that many U.S. think tanks inclined to support wars abroad have ties to the arms industry?

Think tanks are said to be entities that connect research and policy, or knowledge and power. They are widely considered to have originated in the United States and have spread mainly across Western countries; more recently, China and Russia have also been expanding their influence. However, it is pointed out that many think tanks in China and Russia have not broken free from government control.

So are think tanks in the West and other places—those that are supposed to maintain a certain “independence” from their own governments—really at arm’s length? This article explores how think tanks and governments or the arms industry influence one another in the fields of military and security policy.

A Brookings Institution fellow and a U.S. military official in conversation at a Brookings event (Photo: ResoluteSupportMedia / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])

The military-industrial complex

As noted at the outset, the relationship between governments and research institutions is noteworthy in military and security policy, but before that, the relationship between governments and industry is a crucial factor. Before considering the role of think tanks, let us first review the notion of the military-industrial complex.

The “military-industrial complex” refers to the close ties among the arms industry and other industries, the military, and government. The arms industry, such as weapons manufacturers, tends to benefit from security crises like armed conflicts and interstate tensions. The more weapons they sell, and the more contracts they receive to develop and produce new systems, the greater their profits. Even in the absence of conflict or confrontation, weapons procurement and development continue. Moreover, the arms industry’s interests are not limited to weapons makers. For example, building warships requires large amounts of steel, and fighter jets use a wide range of electronic components. Military operations also consume vast quantities of oil. Furthermore, from the construction of military facilities to soldiers’ uniforms and meals, privatization has advanced across many areas. A great many sectors profit from increases in military budgets and weapons exports.

National military budgets are funded by taxpayers, and citizens do not necessarily accept massive military spending. However, if decision-making politicians can be persuaded, the budget can be increased. For that reason, companies connected to the arms industry pour vast sums into lobbying and campaign contributions to politicians. For example, over the past 20 years, the U.S. defense industry has spent $2.5 billion on lobbying and $285 million on campaign contributions.

There are also cases in which arms companies pay huge bribes to government officials to secure government weapons deals. Well-known examples include scandals involving Western weapons manufacturers in Saudi Arabia and South Africa. In addition, in Western countries and elsewhere, retired military personnel often move into the defense industry, leveraging their experience and networks to sell weapons, while personnel from the arms industry sometimes transfer into government agencies. Mutually useful talent circulates between the military and the arms industry, a dynamic often described as a “revolving door.”

As a result, governments purchase or pursue development of unnecessary or underperforming weapons at inflated prices, and military budgets keep growing.

F-35 fighter jet production facility, United States (Photo: Robert Sullivan / Flickr [Public Domain Mark 1.0])

In the United States, military spending hardly declines even in so-called “peacetime” and has risen continuously over the long term. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated a major threat, U.S. military spending began to fall, but alarmed representatives of major weapons manufacturers then strongly lobbied governments to expand NATO. NATO enlargement opened up Central and Eastern European markets, helping weapons makers avert their “crisis.”

Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is another case in point. This conflict, whose background includes the aforementioned NATO expansion and Russia’s invasion, has been a bonanza for arms industries worldwide. Some weapons makers have reportedly told shareholders that profits can be expected going forward. One major Israeli newspaper even argued that the “winners” of the Ukraine war are Israel’s weapons manufacturers. Governments in the West and in Japan have already decided on, or are considering, large increases in their military budgets (※1). The United States has announced more than $40 billion in support for Ukraine, more than half of which is military aid that will flow mainly to U.S. weapons manufacturers. For reference, the total amount of worldwide emergency funding in 2021 for global humanitarian crises channeled through the UN was about $20 billion.

Yet given Russia’s heavy losses and the lack of major advances in its Ukraine campaign, one could reasonably conclude that this war has exposed Russia’s weakness more than its strength, and that Russia is no longer a significant threat. In other words, rather than needing to increase military budgets, this situation arguably demonstrates that there would be no problem even if countries reduced them, a view some hold. To be sure, the threat posed by Russia’s nuclear weapons is an important factor in considering military and security policy. On the other hand, it is hard to argue that there is a military solution to nuclear weapons. The oft-cited strategy of “nuclear deterrence” rests on the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD): that states refrain from using nuclear weapons to avoid the catastrophic consequences of mutual nuclear use. Many experts have argued, however, that nuclear deterrence is not an effective military solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. Even if it were effective, it would require states to be prepared to take the lives of innocent people on the scale of hundreds of thousands or millions—making mere possession of nuclear weapons tantamount to a form of terrorism, in that sense speaking.

As for how the conflict might unfold, Lloyd Austin, who moved from a seat on a weapons maker’s board to become U.S. Secretary of Defense, has acknowledged that the goal of U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war is to weaken Russia—seemingly encouraging a protracted conflict. More than four months after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, there have been no serious diplomatic efforts toward a peaceful resolution. One could argue that the close relationships between governments and the arms industry are among the factors underlying this situation.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and IISS Director-General John Chipman (Photo: VoidWanderer / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])

Think tanks that encourage military buildup and hawkish diplomacy

How, then, are think tanks connected to this military-industrial complex? In fact, not infrequently, many think tanks can be seen as repeating or amplifying the views of governments, militaries, or the arms industry.

First, think tanks in many countries regularly publish reports arguing for increases in their nations’ military budgets. In the United States, organizations such as the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the RAND Corporation are frequently cited for pushing U.S. military spending higher and calling for military buildup. Germany’s German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) likewise published a report in 2013 urging Germany to take leadership in international politics, strengthen its military capabilities, and use force when necessary. In Japan, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), considered the country’s leading foreign and security policy think tank, used its Strategic Annual Report (2021) to support raising defense spending to at least 2% of GDP in line with government policy. In the 2021 lower house elections, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party pledged to aim for defense spending equivalent to 2% of GDP, following NATO.

Beyond official, institutional views, influential think-tank scholars often call for higher military budgets through the media. For example, a 2017 New York Times article on increases in U.S. military spending quoted an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlighting alleged underfunding of the U.S. military—even though, at the time, U.S. military spending already accounted for 36% of global military expenditures. In Japan, a newspaper interview in 2021 and a column in the Mainichi Shimbun’s digital edition featured a Sasakawa Peace Foundation scholar calling for higher Japanese military spending.

Even when think tanks do not directly advocate higher military budgets, they may highlight international issues that ultimately lead to increases. For instance, in addition to weapons manufacturers that supported NATO expansion right after the Cold War, U.S. think tanks such as the RAND Corporation also promoted NATO enlargement through workshops and research activities.

RAND Corporation headquarters, Santa Monica, California, United States (Photo: Coolcaesar / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 4.0])

Not infrequently, think tanks emphasize threats from other countries or stoke anxiety. For example, a 2002 report by the UK’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) suggested that Iraq likely possessed large quantities of biological and chemical weapons and might be able to complete a nuclear weapon within months—claims that proved false. In Japan, as of 2022, not a few think tanks promote ideas such as nuclear sharing or even nuclear acquisition in preparation for potential attacks by China or North Korea. One example is a 2022 post to the Japan Forum on International Relations’ “e-Forum” arguing that the “option” of acquiring nuclear weapons for self-defense should not be ruled out.

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Israel, in its 2020 Strategic Assessment, emphasized the “threat” from Iran and argued that the likelihood of Israel facing a large-scale war was increasing. Another Israeli think tank, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), published a report in 2016 opposing the eradication of IS (the Islamic State), contending that IS served as a “useful tool” against Israel’s adversaries such as Syria and Iran.

Think tanks also sometimes distort facts to accentuate external threats. The U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), whose analyses and views on the war in Ukraine are frequently cited in the media, has been criticized for biased assessments that impede objective understanding. In addition, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) often highlights China as a “threat” to Australia and urges a hardline stance toward Beijing, but its China studies reportedly contain many errors and unsubstantiated claims, as noted by critics.

With exceptions, think tanks and their researchers who wield influence with governments and the media in many countries tend to emphasize external threats and encourage military buildup.

A residence detonated by U.S. forces, Iraq (Photo: Sergeant James McCauley / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 2.0])

Structural problem: think tanks’ funding

Why do so many think tanks and their researchers promote national military buildup? To understand the causes, we must examine think tanks’ structural features. There are various kinds of think tanks. Their missions and activities differ depending on the roles envisioned at founding. Models include those that function like universities engaged in research but without students; those that conduct commissioned research for governments and others; and those that carry out advocacy work. A think tank is not necessarily confined to just one role; it is common to combine multiple roles. Think tanks can also be classified by affiliation, partnerships, and their distance from power: those primarily funded by government; those allied with government or political parties; those financed by corporations; those attached to universities; and nonprofit organizations formed as part of civil society.

Regardless of the model, funding is a key to understanding an organization’s direction and activities. Many think tanks do not fully disclose their finances, and it is not easy to obtain sufficient information from what is public (※2). Even so, the scale of funding flowing from militaries and the arms industry is visible in disclosures. For example, a 2020 study found that from 2014 to 2019, the 50 most influential U.S. think tanks received at least $1 billion from the U.S. military, other national security-related government agencies, and the arms industry.

Financial ties among governments, the arms industry, and think tanks also appear at a more granular level. For instance, CNAS in the U.S. published a favorable report on military contractors in war zones (i.e., private military companies) in 2009, while receiving funding from several private military firms around the same time. The same think tank was also found to have issued a report in 2019 encouraging loans to companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin while receiving funding from them.

These financial relationships cross borders. The UK’s IISS does not disclose its sources of funding, but it is said that at least one quarter of its budget flows from the government of Bahrain, which has reportedly affected its research on Yemen and the Gulf states, according to commentators. Other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar fund multiple think tanks in the United States and the United Kingdom to influence discourse and policy toward their countries. Taiwan likewise provides funding to U.S. think tanks regarding policy toward China. China has also begun funding foreign think tanks, but the scale is relatively small at present.

Then–U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis speaking at an IISS conference on U.S. Middle East policy funded by Bahrain (Photo: U.S. Secretary of Defense / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])

Governments have various reasons to fund think tanks, but in most cases the aim is to secure support from legislatures and the public for their policies and budget allocations. “Research” by think tanks that appear “independent” of the government can buttress the necessity of government proposals and bolster their legitimacy. Companies in the arms industry also likely fund think tanks to enhance their influence on government. If a think tank backs claims about the necessity or utility of a firm’s weapon systems, those messages may reach government officials involved in decisions on procurement or financing. Even when not directly tied to sales, expanding connections with government officials alone has value.

Amid these dynamics, think tanks seek stable and growing funding streams, which often means taking money from governments and defense-related companies—and conducting the research such funders desire, issuing analyses aligned with government and industry preferences—creating a tendency in that direction.

Structural problem: think tank personnel

Beyond funding, an organization’s staffing also reveals its direction and interests. As with the government/military and the arms industry, the flow of personnel between governments/militaries and think tanks is often described as a “revolving door.” Researchers who study policy and provide advice at think tanks can be immediately useful to governments, and many move into public service. In some countries, when opposition parties become the ruling party, researchers “waiting” at think tanks close to the new ruling party are drawn into government—a pattern seen in both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States.

Conversely, think tanks also serve as landing spots for former government officials and retired military personnel. In the United States, Germany, and Japan, for example, boards of think tanks dealing with security issues often include retired officers and former Self-Defense Forces personnel. There are also cases of secondments of active-duty officers to think tanks.

CSIS and JIIA representatives speaking at a conference on the Japan-U.S. security alliance (Photo: CSIS / Flickr [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0])

Through seminars, study groups, and publications, think tanks also network externally, collaborating with current officials and former government figures, military personnel and members of the Self-Defense Forces at home and abroad, people in the arms industry, university faculty, and others. In Japan, for example, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation published a book in 2022 on a Taiwan Strait contingency; most of the authors had prior SDF service, and some currently hold titles such as adviser to weapons manufacturers.

The “revolving door” brings many benefits to think tanks. When a think tank researcher moves into a government post, ties to the government are strengthened and the think tank’s potential to influence policy grows. Hiring people who have built their careers in government or the military also deepens connections with those institutions and helps expand networks. Increased access to current officials and officers can also aid fundraising through research projects and more.

However, the fact that think tanks—supposedly at some remove from government—produce research outcomes welcomed by governments and the arms industry is unlikely to be the result of suppressing internal research or muzzling scholars. Individual researchers who emphasize the need to build up national military power or take a hard line toward other countries often held the same views before joining a think tank and likely believe such policies are wise for their country. On the hiring side, think tanks will first assess whether candidates can, in both ability and ideology, deliver the kinds of research projects sought by clients and donors. Likewise, decisions on who is entrusted with projects and who is promoted are likely to consider researchers’ ideological orientations. Power welcomes capable people who share its ideas, while those who flock to centers of power tend to assimilate the prevailing ideology.

Beyond the military-industrial–think tank complex

As we have seen, in matters of war, peace, and security, governments and militaries, the arms industry, and think tanks influence one another and tend to form a single complex. Other actors are also connected to this system. Think tanks often invite university faculty suited to their research to serve as visiting fellows or members of research projects.

The news media, too, have close ties to think tanks. To substantiate information or arguments they present, media outlets quote think-tank researchers’ views, and at times those views are featured prominently in interviews and op-eds. For media that are supposed to pursue objective facts, views from think tanks and their scholars that are close to governments or the arms industry are likely laden with various biases and interests; ideally, the media should not rely excessively on them. However, with rare exceptions, outlets almost never include disclaimers such as “this think tank receives funding from the government or the arms industry” when citing think-tank views. They tend simply to report them as objective “expert opinions.”

Missiles on display at an arms fair, Ukraine (Photo: VoidWanderer / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 4.0])

In the United States, this expanding network that goes beyond the “military-industrial complex” or the “military-industrial–think tank complex” is sometimes called the “military-industrial-Congressional-intelligence-media-academia-think tank complex” (MICIMATT). It is also referred to as the “military-industrial propaganda complex.”

Whatever the label, among stakeholders surrounding global military and security affairs there exists an “ecosystem” that, in response to international problems and conflicts, emphasizes threats and encourages escalation and military buildup. Rather than being a coordinated effort among stakeholders or an environment in which power controls speech, it is a setting sustained by interlocking interests across many organizations, including financial incentives. Within it, the role of think tanks is by no means small.

※1 In postwar Japan, under the Constitution, the country has taken an “exclusively defense-oriented” posture and refers to its forces as the Self-Defense Forces rather than an army or military. For that reason the Japanese government calls the general military budget the “defense budget.” Because that budget funds SDF personnel salaries and purchases and maintenance of military equipment such as fighter jets, warships, and tanks—uses similar to those of other countries’ military budgets—this article treats Japan’s defense budget as a de facto military budget and, for consistency with the U.S. and others, refers to it as “military budget.”

※2 For example, on the JIIA website, at the bottom of the “About the Institute” page is a “Organization and Funding” section, in smaller font than the rest, that simply states: “Funding consists mainly of operating revenues from commissioned research contracts from government and other bodies, membership fees, publication revenues, and special grants.” If you check each year’s budget from the “Information Disclosure” page, you will see that most funding comes from treasury subsidies, but it is unclear where other revenues—such as from commissioned work—come from. It has also been pointed out that think tanks in the UK, Canada, and Australia likewise disclose far too little about their funding. As for U.S. think tanks, some list donors and rough grant sizes on their websites, but precise information about finances is often not provided.

Writer: Virgil Hawkins

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