In September 2022, armed clashes broke out along the Azerbaijan–Armenia border, leaving about 280 people dead on both sides. The fighting centered on the Nagorno-Karabakh region, long contested by Azerbaijan and Armenia, where military clashes have recurred repeatedly. Despite ceasefire talks after each flare-up, no lasting solution has been reached and tensions remain high. Internationally, Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but it has a large ethnic Armenian population. In the 1990s, after armed conflict, it became de facto independent from Azerbaijan, backed by Armenia, and has been governed as the “Republic of Artsakh” (also known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). This article explores mainly recent developments in the dispute and the influence exerted by other countries.

People attending a commemorative ceremony in Nagorno-Karabakh (Photo: David Stanley / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])

What is Nagorno-Karabakh

The region known as Nagorno-Karabakh lies in southwestern Azerbaijan, which borders Armenia, Iran, Georgia, and Russia. An estimated 95% of the region’s residents identify as Armenian. About a century ago, as the Soviet Union pursued the divide-and-rule of surrounding areas, the region was expected to be incorporated into Armenia. However, in 1923 the USSR created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and, on the geographic grounds that it lay within Azerbaijan, placed it under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction. Many locals were dissatisfied, and for years many sought separation from Azerbaijan and incorporation into Armenia. In 1988 the Nagorno-Karabakh regional assembly adopted a resolution declaring accession to the Republic of Armenia, but Azerbaijan rejected this and suppressed the separatists.

With the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states, and a full-scale war over control of Nagorno-Karabakh broke out between the 2 countries. Azerbaijan, whose military buildup had lagged behind Armenia’s, saw much of its southwest, including Nagorno-Karabakh, come under Armenian control. About 30,000 people were killed and 1,000,000 were displaced. In May 1994, a ceasefire protocol was signed with Russia’s mediation, but no permanent solution was reached. Since then, armed clashes have intermittently erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia, including in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Fighting in April 2016 and May 2017 involved civilians (for more on the deterioration in the 2010s, see here). Large-scale hostilities broke out again in 2020.

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (the 2020 conflict)

From September 27 to November 10, 2020, the second Nagorno-Karabakh war was fought. Each side claimed the other launched a preemptive attack, and intense battles followed. More than 6,500 soldiers on both sides were killed. In contrast to the first war in the 1990s, which left the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” and Armenia exercising de facto control, this second war saw Azerbaijan retake surrounding Azerbaijani territories, including about 40 percent of Nagorno-Karabakh.

What underpinned Azerbaijan’s effective victory? First was strengthened military power. In 1992, Azerbaijan concluded an agreement with Turkey on military training, after which Azerbaijani officer candidates and junior officers received military education at institutions such as the Turkish Army War College. By participating in Turkish military exercises, the Azerbaijani military was forged into a more cohesive force.

Another factor was the vast revenue from oil and natural gas in the Caspian. Particularly from the 2000s, new gas fields were discovered, and energy revenues reached a historic peak between 2010 and 2015. Azerbaijan channeled this into military spending, purchasing military UAVs and drones from Turkey. Using reconnaissance and attack drones, it destroyed Armenian air defenses one after another, inflicting heavy damage. In this way, a stronger Azerbaijan than in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war prevailed.

After 44 days of fighting, Russia brokered a ceasefire on November 9, 2020. Under the agreement, Armenian forces were to withdraw from Armenian-occupied areas, including Nagorno-Karabakh, by December 1, 2020, and Azerbaijan regained the southern part of Nagorno-Karabakh. About 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the region. Still, the ceasefire regime has been deemed fragile, as evidenced by the renewed clashes in September 2022. The core issues of the conflict remain unresolved.

Azerbaijani President Aliyev visits Turkey’s aerospace industry (Photo: President.az / Wikimedia [CC BY 4.0])

Why do they clash?

Why do Azerbaijan and Armenia keep fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh? Why have repeated ceasefire talks failed to produce lasting peace? Let’s first consider the perspectives of the parties themselves.

As noted, historical grievances centered on territory and identity remain unresolved. Because Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan’s borders, the international community recognizes it as Azerbaijani territory, and Azerbaijan does not wish to cede land. In practice, however, many residents identify as Armenian. The Armenian government has long argued that ethnic Armenians in the region have suffered human rights abuses at Azerbaijan’s hands for decades.

In April 2022, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that if the rights of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were guaranteed, Armenia was prepared to regard Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. By contrast, Azerbaijan, now in the stronger position, says it is pursuing a comprehensive settlement and insists that without the return of territory it cannot negotiate—thus no agreement has been reached.

Next, consider the domestic politics shaping the conflict. In 2018, mass street protests against corruption forced the then Armenian government to step down. Afterward, Nikol Pashinyan became prime minister and, following the 2020 war, accepted a ceasefire that returned parts of the Armenian-occupied territories. This drew heavy criticism at home, and he was forced to resign once.

Even after Pashinyan returned as prime minister in August 2021, public expectations in Armenia remained subdued. With no strong opposition, many believe that the outcome of the second war would not have changed regardless of who led the government. In a poll in Armenia, 56% said the country should pursue peace while strengthening the military, and 28% said it should aim for peace while preparing for defense. In other words, those who believe strengthening the military is necessary to protect the country while seeking peace amount to over 80%. On Nagorno-Karabakh specifically, 35% said it should be recognized as an independent state, and 50% said it should establish autonomy as part of Armenia. This suggests that 85% oppose ceding territory.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and Russian President Putin shake hands (Photo: Kremlin.ru / Wikimedia [CC BY 4.0])

In Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev has maintained an authoritarian rule since 2003—19 years and counting. For years, policy failures, systemic corruption, and a haphazard response to COVID-19 were criticized. But the effective victory in the second war boosted his popularity to unprecedented levels, giving him the political capital of having “largely restored national territory.”

Buoyed by momentum, Azerbaijan is seen as eyeing new opportunities. Whether it applies further military pressure or explores a peaceful settlement without renewed fighting, Azerbaijan can currently drive events from a position of advantage. Observers are watching what moves President Aliyev will make before the fervor of wartime patriotism cools.

Influence from other countries

Beyond history and domestic politics, understanding the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute also requires looking at the influence of regional powers. What are the calculations of countries courting Azerbaijan and Armenia?

From the initial outbreak of the conflict, Western involvement has been evident. Among the OSCE’s 57 participating states, the Minsk Group was established in 1992 to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Russia, the United States, and France serve as co-chairs and are authorized to conduct negotiations either separately with Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders or in summit format. Yet despite leading negotiations and mediation for years, the territorial dispute remains deadlocked. As a result, the Minsk Group has been judged ineffective. With Russia increasingly isolated after its invasion of Ukraine, it is unlikely to play a major role going forward.

Azerbaijani President Aliyev meets the Minsk Group co-chairs (Photo: President.az / Wikimedia [CC BY 4.0])

Beyond the Minsk Group, countries including Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States have each exerted influence.

Russia has a military alliance with Armenia under a regional security treaty, meaning it should protect Armenia if attacked. However, during the 2020 war, Russia tolerated Azerbaijan’s attacks on Armenia. Russia also exports weapons to Azerbaijan and maintains relations with both sides. This is thought to be related to the fact that Turkey—important to Russia—supports Azerbaijan, shaping Moscow’s approach. Russia and Turkey have been closely entangled for centuries, including long periods of confrontation such as the Russo-Turkish wars. Yet in 2022, when Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine, Turkey did not join them. Valuing its relationship with Turkey, Russia has little choice but to be more conciliatory toward Turkey-backed Azerbaijan, analysts say.

Fully aware of its pivotal role in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia claims it intends to keep mediating despite its difficulties in Ukraine. Under the 2020 ceasefire, Russian peacekeepers are mandated to remain in the region at least until 2025. Some argue Russia aims less at a decisive resolution than at preserving the status quo to maintain its presence in this geopolitically important area.

Now to Turkey. Bound to Azerbaijan by strong ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious ties, Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence. Azerbaijan is an important hub for supplying gas and oil to European markets via Turkey, and Azerbaijan’s energy exports also benefit Turkey economically, underpinning a strong relationship between them.

As noted, Turkish support was a key backdrop to Azerbaijan’s surge in the 2020 war. Some suggest Azerbaijan wants to resolve the issue while it enjoys this robust backing. With a Turkish presidential election due in June 2023, a defeat for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could weaken support for Azerbaijan—something Baku may seek to preempt by moving first again.

Bullet marks on a wall in Nagorno-Karabakh (Photo: Adam Jones / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])

By contrast, Turkey has no diplomatic relations with Armenia. The two are burdened by the dark history of World War I–era massacres and deportations of Armenians by the then Ottoman Turks. Turkey denies this, but the twentieth-century genocide keeps relations frozen to this day. In 1993, to show solidarity with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey closed its border with Armenia. Seeking to boost its stature as a regional power, Turkey has been actively using military force in conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. In Nagorno-Karabakh, too, it may be more inclined to press a military rather than peaceful resolution, analysts warn. With Turkey and Russia also jockeying for influence in places like Syria and Libya, Turkey’s involvement in this region is likewise likely to continue.

Now to Iran. Iran has generally taken a neutral stance on Nagorno-Karabakh. However, many ethnic Azerbaijanis live in Iran’s northwest along the Azerbaijani border. After they held demonstrations calling for support to Azerbaijan, Tehran backed Azerbaijan in the 2020 war. Still, because Azerbaijan’s victory owed much to support from Turkey—a difficult counterpart for Iran—the expansion of Turkish influence is seen as unwelcome in Tehran. Iran is nevertheless considered to have little capacity to mediate and can do little but watch.

Turning to the United States: infrastructure such as railways and pipelines carrying energy resources through the area around Nagorno-Karabakh also affects U.S. interests via its ties with neighboring states. During the 2022 clashes, Washington condemned Azerbaijan. However, its influence is not necessarily decisive and the field has largely been led by Russia and Turkey.

The presidential administration of the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” (Photo: Govorkov / Wikimedia [CC BY 2.0])

U.S. activity, however, is picking up. On April 24, 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden stated that the Ottoman Empire committed genocide against Armenians between 1915 and 1923. This was widely seen as a nod to the Armenian-American community, which has clout in U.S. politics. Armenians, fleeing persecution and mass killings, also came to the United States, and groups with those roots welcomed Biden’s statement, while Turkey, successor to the Ottomans, denied it and condemned it strongly. On Nagorno-Karabakh, the U.S. thus signaled caution toward Turkey, which plays a major role on Azerbaijan’s side.

After the September 2022 clashes, the U.S. issued a statement condemning Azerbaijan. In November, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken hosted talks between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and discussions toward peace were held. Alongside Russia and Turkey, which vie for influence, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will continue trying to mediate.

Lastly, the European Union (EU), which has emerged as a mediator. Since the November 2020 ceasefire, the EU has brought Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders together 4 times. But with no conspicuous breakthroughs, these diplomatic efforts have been judged a failure. Azerbaijan’s hard line—seeking to force Armenia to accept its terms from a position of strength—meant the EU could not play an effective mediating role.

After Russia cut gas supplies in response to sweeping EU sanctions over the February 2022 Ukraine invasion, EU member states have looked to energy imports from Azerbaijan. Even so, their prospects for wielding influence appear limited.

A tank on display in a Nagorno-Karabakh town (Photo: David Stanley / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])

Outlook

As we have seen, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is not just between Azerbaijan and Armenia; it is entangled in multiple countries’ interests, making it structurally complex. With major-power rivalries intensifying over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, multilateral diplomacy like Minsk Group mediation has become difficult. Turkey’s domestic politics and Western energy needs will also continue to shape events.

With tensions high and core issues still unaddressed, there is a serious risk that imprudent military moves could escalate into major conflict. On the other hand, at a three-way summit with Russia’s President Putin on October 31, 2022, Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev agreed to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue peacefully without the use of force. Diplomatic efforts by the parties and stakeholders are needed to translate this commitment into a lasting settlement.

Writer: Manami Hasegawa

Graphic: Haruka Gonno