In mid-August 2020, Turkish and Greek warships collided in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece says it was an “accident,” while Turkey appears to view it as a “provocation.” Greece and Turkey have long been tense with one another, and there have been several military clashes in the past. Moreover, the discovery of large quantities of natural gas in the region in 2010 has further heightened tensions between the two countries. The new resources that have emerged in the Eastern Mediterranean are now affecting interstate relations not only between Greece and Turkey but across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. This article looks at the history of the Eastern Mediterranean and the situation surrounding natural gas.

The Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East as seen from the International Space Station (Photo: NASA Johnson / Flickr.com [CC BY 2.0])

The Eastern Mediterranean backdrop

There are various views on the exact scope of the Eastern Mediterranean, but it is generally taken to include southeastern Europe—especially Greece; Anatolia, which makes up most of Turkey; the island of Cyprus; Syria; Lebanon; Israel; Egypt; and Libya. The Eastern Mediterranean also connects to the Black Sea to the north via the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and to the Indian Ocean to the south via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Historically, this region was economically and culturally important to ancient Greek city-states, the Persian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and others.

15th century, the Ottoman Empire seized Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul), the capital of the Byzantine Empire, and established hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean and Greek territories.In 1821, the Greek War of Independence began, in which Greece, backed by Britain, France, and Russia, won independence from the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter, conflicts such as the Russo-Turkish War (1877) and the First Balkan War (1912) broke out between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and the region saw prolonged strife.

As World War I drew to a close, the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Greece invaded Anatolia in an attempt to reclaim lands it had held during the Byzantine era, and in 1919 the Greco-Turkish War began. At the time, the Ottoman Empire was in the process of transforming into the Republic of Turkey. Although Greek forces advanced as far as central-western Anatolia, in 1921 they were pushed back by a Turkish counteroffensive.In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne established territorial arrangements between Greece and Turkey and set terms for a population exchange of minorities.

However, tensions flared again in 1974 over the island of Cyprus, which is composed mainly of ethnic Greeks and ethnic Turks. In the late 19th century, control of the island shifted from the Ottoman Empire to Britain. Under British rule, Greek Cypriots began advocating enosis (union with Greece), while Turkish Cypriots called for an independent state separate from both Greece and Turkey. In the late 1950s, armed groups dominated by Greek Cypriots formed and launched a guerrilla war for independence from Britain and union with Greece. In 1960, Cyprus gained independence from Britain and established the Republic of Cyprus (hereafter: Cyprus). However, conflicts with Turkish Cypriots continued, and in 1974 Greek Cypriots, with support from Greece, carried out a coup. In response, the Turkish military intervened in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the island was divided into the Republic of Cyprus, dominated by Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (hereafter: Northern Cyprus), dominated by Turkish Cypriots.

The dividing line between the Republic of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus (Photo: Marco Fieber / Flickr.com [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0] )

The protagonists in the Eastern Mediterranean are not only Greece and Turkey. Middle Eastern countries such as Israel and Egypt are also key actors. In 1948, British rule over Palestine ended and the State of Israel was declared within that territory. As a result, the ongoing tensions between Jewish and Arab residents escalated into full-scale war. Neighboring Arab states intervened militarily, sparking the First Arab-Israeli War. This large-scale conflict continued until 1973 (the Fourth Arab-Israeli War) and also involved the Suez Canal, one of the world’s major trade routes.

The Suez Canal lies within Egypt’s territory and connects the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, cutting Europe–Asia sailing times in half and thus occupying a crucial position. Today, about 12% of world trade passes through the canal, which is also essential for transporting oil and natural gas. Construction of the canal, begun by a French company in 1859, was completed in 1869. When Egypt nationalized it in 1956, France, Israel, and Britain intervened militarily, triggering the Suez Crisis. Political tensions between Israel and Palestine have also influenced the Eastern Mediterranean. The Gaza Strip, which often draws attention due to humanitarian concerns, faces the Mediterranean, and access to it is restricted by Israel.

Relations between Syria and Russia have also affected the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia does not border the Mediterranean, but it maintains close diplomatic relations with Syria and operates a naval base on Syrian territory. Since Soviet times, Russia has cultivated good relations with Middle Eastern countries. In particular, Syria under the al-Assad family, in power since 1966, is an ally of Russia and has received continuous support. In 2011, the Syrian conflict began, and in 2015 the al-Assad government requested military support from Russia, prompting Russian air force intervention in Syria. Russian forces remain active in Syria today.

The Suez Canal, Israel, and Syria are often seen as separate issues. However, as will be discussed below, when viewed through the lens of the natural gas fields being developed around the Eastern Mediterranean and the routes for transporting that gas, these areas are closely interconnected, making the region one with significant geopolitical risks. Beyond the countries already mentioned, Libya and Lebanon are also stakeholders as Eastern Mediterranean littoral states, and the influence of actors from outside the region, such as Italy, France, and the United States, cannot be ignored.

Discovery and development of natural gas fields

In 2010, vast natural gas fields were discovered in Israeli waters in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Leviathan field, as it is known, was among the largest discovered anywhere in the world in the previous decade. It was estimated that Leviathan could cover Israel’s gas needs for 40 years and still leave enough for exports. Its discovery raised expectations for new finds and triggered a wave of exploration around the Eastern Mediterranean. Subsequently, the Aphrodite field in Cypriot waters and the Zohr field in Egyptian waters were discovered, giving countries in the region a chance to become major gas exporters. To avoid conflict and proceed efficiently with development, countries such as Israel and Cyprus began building cooperative frameworks to develop these fields. However, Turkey and Northern Cyprus are not part of this cooperation.

Leviathan natural gas field, Israel (Photo: Deror Avi / Wikimedia [CC BY-SA 4.0])

For Cyprus and Israel, European countries seeking new natural gas sources are the most attractive customers. Exporting gas requires pipelines. The shortest route from the Eastern Mediterranean to European markets would run via Greece to Italy, connecting with Europe’s existing pipeline network. On that basis, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed a trilateral agreement to cooperate on developing and exporting natural gas.

In 2014, as part of efforts to diversify energy imports, the European Union (EU) designated three pipelines known collectively as the Southern Gas Corridor as “projects of common interest” (see Note 1) for priority support. Two of the three corridors transport gas from the Caspian Sea—rich in natural gas—through Turkey and Greece to Europe. These two pipelines are the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), linking Azerbaijan with Turkey and Greece and completed in 2018, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), running from Greece to Italy and completed in 2020. However, the discovery of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean provided Western Europe with an alternative supply closer than the Caspian fields—the EastMed Pipeline, newly conceived in the 2013 Southern Gas Corridor plans. If completed, this pipeline would bypass TANAP and TAP and deliver gas from Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt to Western Europe via Greece. The roughly 1,900-kilometer EastMed Pipeline is scheduled for completion in 2027. Through the Southern Gas Corridor, EU member states hope to reduce their dependence on Russia, their largest gas supplier, and increase imports from other sources.

Egypt, which discovered the Zohr field, is also seeking to become a major player in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy sector. Egypt already has facilities to liquefy natural gas and plans to receive gas from other countries, liquefy it, and export it. In 2018, Egypt and Cyprus agreed to transport gas from the Aphrodite field to Egypt via pipeline. The liquefied gas is to be shipped worldwide by tanker.

Albania, construction of the pipeline (TAP) (Photo: Albinfo / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 4.0])

To further coordinate gas development in the Eastern Mediterranean, countries beyond the Greece–Cyprus–Israel trilateral are also building cooperative ties. In 2020, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Italy, together with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, formally established the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). France joined as a member in September of the same year, and the United States was also approved to participate as a permanent observer that year. In April 2021, the EU applied to become a permanent observer, but a decision has not yet been made. On March 9, 2021, the EMGF charter officially entered into force.

Despite the many countries joining the EMGF, Turkey—a regional power—is not among them. This illustrates the geopolitical risks in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) issues

In recent years, the main source of friction between Turkey and its Mediterranean neighbors has been maritime boundaries. Many Greek islands lie close to the Turkish coast, leading to disputes between the two countries over delimiting waters. A similar situation exists between Turkey and Cyprus. Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) exists to mediate such disputes, Turkey has not signed the convention.

The purpose of UNCLOS is to establish guidelines for maritime activities and the use of the seas by clearly defining Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). In essence, an EEZ is a maritime zone where a state has sovereign rights over natural resources and energy, as well as the exploration and exploitation of marine resources. UNCLOS sets the EEZ as extending up to 200 nautical miles from the coastline. This also applies to islands, with the EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from an island’s coast. Where EEZs of different states overlap, the matter is to be resolved through bilateral agreements based on cooperation and good faith (see Note 2).

However, the Turkish government argues that UNCLOS favors states with many islands or archipelagic territories and is therefore unfair, and it has not signed the convention. For example, the Greek island of Kastellorizo lies only about 3 kilometers from Turkey’s coast; under UNCLOS it would be counted as a Greek island with its own EEZ, substantially reducing Turkey’s waters. Turkey therefore argues that EEZs should be delimited based on the continental shelf instead of UNCLOS principles. Under Turkey’s position, its EEZ would not be limited to 200 nautical miles but would extend to the edge of its continental shelf.

View from Kastellorizo, Greece (Photo: Mark Gregory / Flickr.com [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

Thus, the fact that the EEZs claimed by Greece and Cyprus overlap significantly with Turkey’s continental shelf underlies the confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Turkey does not recognize Cyprus. For that reason, Turkey opposes development of gas fields in Cypriot waters and construction of the EastMed Pipeline. After the discovery of the Aphrodite field, Cyprus began exploring options to develop it, drawing strong criticism from Turkey. Turkey argued that Cyprus has no right to unilaterally explore for gas without the consent of Northern Cyprus. Meanwhile, Turkey dispatched survey and drilling ships to the Eastern Mediterranean to search for gas and oil fields. These vessels operate mainly in areas that UNCLOS designates as Greek and Cypriot waters, but Turkey claims that it and Northern Cyprus have development rights there.

For Turkey, the development of Eastern Mediterranean gas is not just about the waters around Cyprus. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, completed in 2018, was expected to cement Turkey’s role as an energy hub between Central Asia and Europe. However, once the EastMed Pipeline is completed, the importance of TANAP will diminish, and with it Turkey’s position will be weakened. Seeking to regain influence in the region, Turkey turned toward Libya.

Links with Libya

Libya, far from the Eastern Mediterranean gas fields, was drawn into maritime boundary disputes through Turkey’s political outreach. In recent years Libya has been embroiled in armed conflict, and one background factor is the presence of multiple parties with stakes in gas field development. The wave of citizen uprisings against authoritarian regimes across North Africa and the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring, began in 2010 and led to regime change in Libya in 2011. The long dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi collapsed, but power in Libya then bifurcated. In the conflict between the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) formed in 2015 and the rival Libyan National Army (LNA), various actors intervened. Turkey intervened militarily on the GNA side with support from Qatar, while Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Russia provided military support to the LNA.

Against this backdrop, in 2019 Turkey concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the GNA on maritime boundaries. Under UNCLOS-defined EEZs, Libya’s and Turkey’s zones would not touch. However, based on the continental-shelf EEZ concept that Turkey advocates, this MoU connects the two countries’ EEZs. Under the MoU, the boundary approaches the waters around the Greek island of Crete, overlaps significantly with the EEZ that UNCLOS assigns to Greece, and could affect the planned EastMed Pipeline. Each party appears to have its own motives. For Turkey, the agreement bolsters the legitimacy of a continental-shelf-based EEZ and expands the waters in which it can explore and develop natural resources. For the GNA, endorsing Turkey’s position secures military support from Turkey to maintain and consolidate its power base.

Turkish warship (Photo: 495756 [Pixabay License])

Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and even the EU and the United States voiced strong opposition. The European Parliament has also argued that the MoU between Turkey and the GNA is invalid under international law, noting that for an agreement between states to be valid it must be ratified by both governments. In this case the MoU was agreed between Turkey and the GNA, but only Turkey’s parliament ratified it. Libya has both an upper and a lower house, and both must agree to ratify international treaties. However, in 2019, the speaker of Libya’s lower house stated that the MoU threatened good relations with neighboring Mediterranean countries and that he would not agree to it,declaring his opposition.

Other countries’ interests

Newly discovered gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean have prompted moves by actors both within and beyond the region. Russia and Syria have maintained cooperation in the energy sector since the 2000s based on their close relations. More recently, Syria’s EEZ is also believed to contain gas deposits. In 2013, the government led by Bashar al-Assad granted the Russian energy company Soyuzneftegaz the rights to explore and exploit natural resources in Syria’s EEZ. However, the United States has imposed economic sanctions on the Syrian government that also apply to foreign firms doing business with it. To circumvent these sanctions, it was revealed that another company was established in Panama as a front for Soyuzneftegaz. Because the Syrian conflict continued, Soyuzneftegaz did not exercise those rights for years, but in March 2021 it began exploration off the Syrian coast. For Russia, the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, the value of Eastern Mediterranean gas fields may lie less in the resources themselves than in enhancing its influence in the region, as some have pointed out. By joining the competition over gas in the region, Russia may seek to maintain some leverage over the European market. Russian companies have also secured development rights not only in Syria but also in Israel, Cyprus, and Lebanon. However, the area granted to Soyuzneftegaz for drilling overlaps with the waters of neighboring Lebanon, becoming a source of friction between Syria and Lebanon.

The United States, on the other hand, appears to prioritize the security of sea lanes over the Eastern Mediterranean’s gas. Ensuring safe maritime routes requires cooperation between Greece and Turkey, both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Washington wants to avoid continued tensions between the two. Meanwhile, issues such as Turkey’s EU accession bid, migration, and more recently France’s diplomatic strategy—Paris has clashed with Turkey over the Turkey–Libya MoU—have stoked instability in the region’s dynamics as well. A member of the EMGF, France is supporting Greece and Egypt in developing Eastern Mediterranean resources and is providing military assistance, exacerbating the confrontational structure between these countries and Turkey. Concerned about Turkey’s growing military footprint in the region, France has also deployed naval forces to the Mediterranean.

Informal meeting on the Cyprus issue, April 27, 2021 (Photo: UN Geneva / Flickr.com [CC BY-SA 2.0])

Toward resolving the natural gas dispute

The turf wars over natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean are extremely complex, involving many countries and linked to several armed conflicts. The web of interests extends beyond the region, and resolving the disputes will require some form of compromise between Turkey and EMGF member states. For example, some experts argue that a possible trade-off would be for Turkey to recognize Crete’s EEZ while Greece relinquishes claims around Kastellorizo.

The issue can also be viewed from another angle: the environment. There is a view that further development of natural gas— a fossil fuel that drives climate change—should not proceed. In reality, however, gas development in the Eastern Mediterranean is more likely to accelerate than slow down.

In any case, it is crucial to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict in the region. It is urgent to include all parties in efforts to de-escalate tensions and seek solutions.

Note 1: Projects of Common Interest (PCI) are key cross-border infrastructure projects that link EU countries’ energy systems.

Note 2: As provided in Article 74 of UNCLOS.

Writer: Yosif Ayanski

Graphics: Mayuko Hanafusa

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