El Salvador is a small country in Central America. In this nation, once known for having the world’s worst homicide rate, a major change is underway. From 2019 to 2020, the homicide rate was cut in half. What exactly has happened in El Salvador? This article seeks to find out.

Armed police officers (Photo: Presidencia El Salvador / Wikimedia Commons［CC0 1.0］)

Why were so many homicides occurring?

In El Salvador, long dubbed the murder capital of the world, there were 6,656 homicides in 2015. Converted to a national homicide rate, this comes to roughly 116 victims per 100,000 people—more than 17 times the global average. The high levels of homicide are attributed to factors such as gangs rooted in impoverished communities, a history of conflict that continued until recent decades, and the country’s role as a relay point in the international trade of illegal drugs. Let’s examine why homicides became so prevalent in El Salvador.

El Salvador became a Spanish colony in the 16th century, after Columbus reached the Americas. In the early 1800s, it gained independence from Spain as part of the Mexican Empire, and then separated from Mexico along with other Central American countries to form the Federal Republic of Central America. Subsequently, it became the independent Republic of El Salvador, shaping the modern state.

Because El Salvador’s economy developed primarily through coffee production, a power structure in which landowners and an oligarchic elite held significant influence took root from independence onward, leading to economic disparities and social tensions. Against this backdrop, after the 1959 revolution in neighboring Cuba created a socialist state, an anti-government conflict began in El Salvador in 1972. At that time, the world was in a Cold War between the socialist Soviet Union and the capitalist United States. The Soviet Union, seeking to exploit El Salvador’s political instability, supported leftist guerrillas and others—partly to bolster forces opposing pro-U.S. military regimes across Central America, often called “America’s backyard.” The United States responded by ramping up support for the pro-U.S. government, further accelerating the conflict in El Salvador. The war between the government and socialist forces from 1980 to 1992 was so large in scale that it claimed 70,000 lives. Military support from both Cold War camps escalated the conflict and pushed the population into hardship. The war also brought the destruction of infrastructure and industry, and increased the numbers of war orphans and child soldiers. Even after the Cold War ended and U.S.-Soviet intervention ceased, democracy failed to function and politics remained corrupt. After the war, reflecting the lingering U.S.-Soviet divide, power alternated between two parties—the pro-U.S. Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), composed of former leftist guerrillas—resulting in an effective duopoly and continued instability. The government struggled to address domestic crime, and agencies were rife with corruption; even customs officials were frequently complicit in drug smuggling.

Created based on a map from Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 3.0]

In addition to such domestic instability, the influx of gang members deported from the United States in the 1990s became one factor driving up the homicide rate. These were gangs organized in California, known as MS-13 (Note 1) and 18th Street (Note 2) gangs. Many of them had fled El Salvador to the U.S. as refugees during the civil war, joined local gangs there, grew in strength, and became organized groups. After the conflict in El Salvador ended, then–California Governor Pete Wilson began forcibly deporting these immigrant gang members as a measure against their rising power and ongoing crimes, which paved the way for their resurgence in El Salvador. As a result, roughly 30 years later, gangs that flowed in during the 1990s are now present in about 90% of municipalities, and those who are family members of gang members or collaborate with them in some way number around 500,000 out of a population of approximately 6.5 million—more than El Salvador’s roughly 25,000 police officers and 13,000 soldiers. These gangs have carried out numerous homicides, persistent extortion of citizens and small businesses, and repeated sexual violence. Notably, money extorted from residents and local businesses accounts for 80% of gang funding and is said to amount to about 3% of GDP. An even more troubling issue is the recruitment of young people into gangs. The war severed social bonds in El Salvador, and many children were left behind by parents who emigrated due to economic insecurity, while others lost parents in the conflict. Gangs target such isolated youth, recruit them, and draw them into their ranks.

Another major factor behind the killings is that El Salvador has become a transit point in drug trafficking. Cocaine and other drugs cultivated in South American countries such as Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are transported by smuggling networks through Central America, including El Salvador, into North America. Clashes between smuggling groups, police, and the military, as well as turf wars involving gangs engaged in drug trafficking, have driven up the homicide rate. Numerous cases have been reported of the military, police, judiciary, and other actors being bought off by smuggling groups, and local residents are oppressed—and in many cases killed—by them.

City at night (Photo: Pixabay ［Pixabay Licence］）

As described above, El Salvador has long faced compounding problems: economic inequality dating back to independence, political instability, and the presence of criminal organizations. The severe deterioration in public security caused by these factors is thought to have produced the extremely high homicide rate.

Conventional responses to criminals such as gangs and drug organizations

From the presidency of Francisco Flores (1999–2004) onward, El Salvador adopted a measure called the Mano Dura (iron fist) policy against gangs. This policy included increased police operations in gang-controlled areas and harsh penalties for suspected gang members. Notably, it permitted arrests of suspected gang members based solely on appearance. The policy encouraged police and security forces to disregard the human rights of gang members or those who merely appeared to be gang members, leading to indiscriminate mass detentions and excessive use of force. It also resulted in the worst-case scenario of extrajudicial killings of gang members by the police. In addition, prison overcrowding became a serious issue. As of September 2013, the number of inmates in El Salvador’s prisons was about three times capacity. With too many inmates to control, fighting between gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street inside overcrowded prisons caused many deaths, forcing authorities to segregate gang members by organization into separate facilities. But housing members of the same gang together only strengthened their cohesion, and gang leaders continued their activities by communicating with members outside via mobile phones. Gangs on the outside, acting on instructions, increasingly resisted the police and caused more deaths. Thus, although the iron fist policy initially reduced homicides by 14% in 2004 and temporarily lowered the national homicide rate, by 2006 the rate had risen to 64.7 per 100,000 people, making the gains short-lived.

Police and civilians (Photo: Presidencia El Salvador / Flickr［CC0 1.0］)

Nayib Bukele assumes the presidency

Nayib Bukele took office as president of El Salvador in June 2019. He assumed the presidency amid a surge in homicides under his predecessor, FMLN President Salvador Sánchez Cerén, who served from 2014 to 2019. During the five years of the Cerén administration, 23,000 people lost their lives to homicide in El Salvador. Despite taking the helm under these dire circumstances, Bukele succeeded in cutting the homicide rate by half—down to 51.3% of the previous year’s level—from June 2019 to May 2020.

President Bukele is a young entrepreneur born in San Salvador. He entered politics by running for and winning the 2012 mayoral race in Nuevo Cuscatlán, La Libertad Department, near the capital San Salvador. He later joined the FMLN and won the 2015 mayoral race to become mayor of San Salvador. He ran in the 2019 presidential election amid growing public distrust of the government stemming from corruption scandals involving former presidents Antonio Saca and Mauricio Funes. Bukele proposed stabilizing relations between the FMLN and ARENA, strengthening coordination among the security forces, the police, and the government, and increasing the budgets of the justice and public security ministries, and he won the presidency.

To change the then-high level of homicide, President Bukele first pledged to improve security policy. He proposed revising prison labor conditions to improve conditions inside prisons; strategies to strengthen law and order; increasing police deployment to rural and other areas far from cities; organizing police battalions to operate in prisons; and establishing an international commission to fight corruption. Crime prevention under the security policy also includes support for the livelihoods of young people caught up in gang activity and victims of gang and other criminal violence.

In addition, a major policy behind the halving of the homicide rate is the Territorial Control Plan. This plan focuses primarily on 22 priority municipalities and deploys long-term patrols by police and the military. Measures were also taken to strengthen the organizational capacity of security forces in anticipation of clashes with gangs. The plan has iron fist–style elements as well. The government warned gang members on the outside that if violence did not decrease, their comrades in prison would be confined to cells with no sunlight or housed together with rival gang members. Where gangs did not comply, these measures were in fact implemented.

President Nayib Bukele (Photo: Presidencia El Salvador / Flickr［CC0 1.0］）

Alongside measures targeting currently active gangs, the government is working to prevent youth from getting involved in gang organizations by providing economic support, expanding scarce job opportunities, and offering access to sports and recreation. For example, the government has organized soccer camps, provided vocational training, and offered scholarships. Among the most important initiatives is the construction of glass-walled, cube-shaped centers called “CUBOs” in poor, violence-plagued communities, with the aim of providing safe spaces for youth entertainment and training. In fact, this initiative was begun by Bukele when he was mayor of San Salvador. As president, he aims to implement it nationwide. The government plans to build at least 50 CUBOs, prioritizing poor areas where gangs wield strong influence. The first CUBO was built in San Salvador in 2018. However, since he became president, progress has stalled due to the very high costs of construction, maintenance, and staffing.

Did President Bukele negotiate with the gangs?

As Bukele’s plans progressed and the homicide rate fell, suspicions emerged: there is no clear explanation for the decline. Given its design, the Territorial Control Plan should have taken longer to bear fruit. According to data from the ministries of justice and public security, the areas where the plan was deployed do not seem to match the areas where homicides decreased. This has led to suspicions of informal talks and an agreement between the government and the gangs. In a recent interview with a spokesman for 18th Street, he claimed there had been an agreement with the government to reduce homicides. The government, however, has repeatedly denied any such agreement, whether public or secret, and no definitive evidence has emerged.

There is no evidence that President Bukele engaged in such talks, but El Salvador has negotiated with gangs in the past. In 2012, in exchange for a gang pledge to reduce inter-gang homicides, killings of civilians, and attacks on security forces, the government agreed to transfer gang leaders from maximum-security prisons to less restrictive facilities and to create social projects—such as economic opportunities and jobs—in marginalized gang communities. After the agreement, daily homicides fell from 15 to 5, and violence levels remained stable for 15 months. However, several flaws became apparent. While official homicide rates fell during the truce, the actual decline in killings may have been smaller than reported. Disappearances increased during this period, suggesting that some killings were not captured by official statistics. A key cause of failure in resolving the problem through dialogue was lack of coordination across government agencies. Because agencies other than the Justice and Public Security Ministry—which led the process—did not provide sufficient support, the government could not meet gang demands beyond prison transfers. After the truce collapsed, violence, including homicide, surged to unprecedented levels, and the negotiation-based ceasefire ended in failure.

Despite the history of a collapsed agreement with gangs and a subsequent spike in homicides, and despite current suspicions that another deal may have been struck, President Bukele has maintained a high approval rating. This is likely because, whether or not he has dealings with gangs, the homicide rate has in fact declined.

Everyday life in El Salvador (Photo: Jdklub / Wikimedia Commons ［CC BY-SA 3.0］）

What it will take to reduce homicides

If public negotiations with gangs were successful, it might be possible to reduce homicides safely. In fact, in a 2016 interview conducted by the online news outlet El Faro, one of MS-13’s key figures said that if there were formal negotiations with the government, the group would consider restraining its members’ activities.

However, there are legal barriers to negotiating with gangs. If talks were to occur, El Salvador would need to overturn a 2015 Supreme Court ruling designating the gangs as terrorist groups, because negotiations with terrorist organizations are not permitted. Legal experts in El Salvador argue that overturning the ruling would require changing a law that has already been adopted, making it extremely difficult. In practical terms, public negotiations between the government and the gangs still appear unlikely.

No matter how many policies the government enacts to reduce homicides by targeting gangs, as long as El Salvador remains a transit point in the international drug trade, gangs and killings are unlikely to disappear. The country is moving to shift control of drug markets from illegal organizations to the authorities through the legalization/decriminalization of some drugs, such as marijuana, but for now, drugs continue to flow across the Americas.

It is clear that reducing El Salvador’s high homicide rate is an extremely complex task. With gangs deeply embedded in the country, all kinds of institutions must be reexamined from the ground up. Even so, the emergence of an innovative leader in President Bukele has created an opportunity to change the longstanding devastation in El Salvador. If the situation can be turned around, it will help save the young people who will carry the country’s future. We should keep a close eye on the reforms underway in El Salvador.

Cityscape of San Salvador (Photo: Rene Aguiluz / Flickr［CC BY-NC-ND 2.0］）

Note 1: Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is a large gang operating in Central America and the United States. There are several theories about the origin of the name. “Mara” is said to come from La Mara, a street in San Salvador, the capital of El Salvador. “Salvatrucha” is said to derive from terms used during training of FMLN soldiers in the Salvadoran Civil War.

Note 2: 18th Street Gang. A gang based in Los Angeles in the United States. The name is said to derive from the gang’s original turf on 18th Street in Los Angeles.

Writer: Hikaru Kato

Graphics: Saki Takeuchi

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