“The war is over.” On 2021年8月15日, a spokesperson for the Taliban, an armed group in Afghanistan, declared the capture of the capital Kabul and said this. With the Taliban’s victory and seizure of power, the Ashraf Ghani administration effectively collapsed. The impact of this “end of the war” and the rebirth of the Taliban regime has spread not only within Afghanistan but also to surrounding regions, forcing countries to respond. This article focuses on the Central Asian countries to the north of Afghanistan (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan), which showed various reactions to this development.
Leaders of the Central Asian countries have repeatedly claimed that they have become bases for or targets of the Taliban and other groups labeled as “Islamic extremists” (※1). At the same time, in Central Asia the majority of the population is said to be Muslim, and Islam is a religion rooted in the daily lives of many citizens. When the Central Asian states gained independence in 1991, leaders sought to enhance their own standing by emphasizing their identity as Muslims to rally public support.
How have the politics of the Central Asian countries engaged with religion, and how have they used it? In this article, we explore the relationship between politics and Islam in the countries of Central Asia.
A picture evoking Soviet policy in the 1920s encouraging people to go to school instead of the mosque (Photo: Jean-Pierre Dalbéra / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])
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Islam and Central Asia’s tumultuous history
In all of the 5 Central Asian countries, Muslims make up a majority of the population. Even in Kazakhstan, which has the smallest proportion, it is estimated at 70% (as of 2009), while in Tajikistan, which has the largest, it is estimated at 98% (as of 2014). However, a large Muslim population does not mean that Islam has always been respected in state and politics throughout the region’s history.
Islam is thought to have become established in Central Asia around the 8th century. Going back to the 7th century, the Islamic dynasties in the Middle East (※2), which were expanding their power, invaded and subdued areas around southern Turkmenistan to further strengthen their influence through expansion of conquered territories and the propagation of Islam. In the 8th century, the Islamic dynasty defeated China’s Tang dynasty in a struggle for supremacy in Central Asia near the present-day border between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This gave the Islamic dynasties real control in Central Asia, and a system of rule by Islamic dynasties continued for the next 400 years. Through these developments, Islam took root in Central Asia.
From the 17th century onward, the Russian Empire, which was steadily expanding its power in pursuit of great-power status, advanced its conquest of Central Asia. Since then, Islam in the region has been buffeted by Russian imperial policies. At first, the Russian Empire appeared to support Islamic culture: it built mosques and allocated funds for the development of Islamic literature. However, what the Russian Empire encouraged was the form of Islam it recognized as “official.” For example, local forms of Islam rooted in indigenous customs—such as those practiced among the nomads of Kazakhstan—were not encouraged. Because Islam was already a significant force in Central Asia that could potentially hinder Russian rule, it appears the empire sought to establish a system of control by proactively promoting the form of Islam it deemed “official” and exercising control.
By the mid-19th century, when Russian imperial rule over Central Asia had been largely established, its policies took the form of further restricting Islamic activities. Measures included dispatching missionaries to these regions to convert people to Christianity, the dominant religion in Russia; limiting the number of Islamic clergy; and prohibiting the opening of mosques or Islamic educational institutions without permission from the authorities. For the Russian Empire, religion was a tool of governance, and intervention in Islam in particular intensified.
In the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Russian Empire collapsed and the Soviet regime was born. At first the Soviet regime declared that it would protect minorities oppressed during the imperial era, including Muslims, and it gained support. But as opposition forces faded, the Soviet regime reversed course and intensified repression of Islam. With the formation of the Soviet Union and the incorporation of the 5 Central Asian republics in the 1920s, mosques were closed and the wearing of the hijab (※3), which covers a woman’s head and body, was banned. Furthermore, in the 1920s, as Russian-language education was made compulsory and Russian adopted as an official language, Arabic—which Muslims often use in worship—gradually declined. Access to Islamic books written in Arabic, including the Qur’an, became difficult, creating barriers to exchanges between Central Asia and neighboring Islamic regions.
A 1921 Soviet propaganda poster calling for the liberation of women (Photo: Wikimedia Commons [public domain])
During World War II, when the cooperation of the entire population under Soviet control was needed, the policy shifted from banning Islam to placing it under tighter control. In 1943, an institution called the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia (SADUM) was established, and under this Soviet-controlled body, Islamic book publishing and the training of clergy were carried out. Clergy were appointed by the government and others, and mosques were registered. As long as it remained within this thorough government oversight, Islam was regarded by the government as “good” Islam worthy of approval. At the same time, the stronger the government’s intervention became, the more “bad” Islam—forms of faith that sought to avoid government control—also developed. This “bad” Islam grew quietly on collective farms and underground, but the Soviet authorities saw such activity beyond their oversight as anti-government plotting, deeming it “dangerous” and a “threat” to the state.
Politics and Islam in the Central Asian states
In the 1980s, with political reforms in the Soviet Union, there was a trend toward easing controls on Islam in Central Asia. The publication of books in Arabic and religious education became possible again, bringing Islam closer to citizens. When the Soviet Union collapsed and the 5 Central Asian states became independent in 1991, countries with deep ties to Islam—such as Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia—supported an Islamic revival in Central Asia.
However, after independence, Central Asian countries have in some respects appeared to inherit Soviet policies that labeled Muslims and politicized religion. SADUM, which had effectively managed and controlled Islam, was disbanded, but each country established regulatory bodies for Islam in its place. In Uzbekistan, from 1994 to 1997, persecution of “unofficial” Islam not recognized by the government intensified. Men who wore long beards, regarded as a marker of strict religiosity (※4), were subjected to arbitrary detention and harassment; mosques were closed; and “unofficial” clerics disappeared one after another. Through government-controlled media, strict Muslims were also labeled “terrorists” and “extremists.” In recent years, for example in Tajikistan, men growing beards and women wearing the hijab are deemed “foreign” ways of worship and are subject to state restrictions.
People in Kyrgyzstan at prayer (Photo: IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])
Thus, Islam in the Central Asian states has constantly been inseparable from politics. One background factor is likely the desire of national leaders to maintain their own power bases. In a religion followed by the majority, if the influence of religious leaders grows, leaders’ positions could be threatened. At the same time, if all Islamic practice were completely regulated, it would provoke public backlash. Hence, there is an aspect of justifying intervention in Islam by stoking fears of “Islamic extremism” as a pretext. Religious practice is framed as a security issue, and governments continue to interfere in people’s faith on security grounds. Indeed, since the 1990s when the Central Asian countries became independent, in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, for example, crackdowns on Islam have tightened under the pretext of increased extremist activity.
Islam as a diplomatic tool
Countries outside Central Asia also politically exploit Islam in the region. After the Soviet collapse and the independence of the Central Asian states, there was a shortage of mosques and a lack of economic capacity to revive Islamic culture. Countries with deep Islamic ties, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, began providing support. Behind this support, however, there are various state-level calculations, not just charity toward Muslims.
A mosque with an adjacent Islamic school in Khiva, Uzbekistan (Photo: Dan Lundberg / Flickr [CC BY-SA 2.0])
For Saudi Arabia, support for Islam in Central Asia is said to have included a propaganda Wahhabi aim—promoting a return to a “pure” Islamic faith and advocating a near-literal reading of the Qur’an. In addition to building mosques, it has supported the distribution of Islamic textbooks and the establishment of educational centers, spending large sums over the past several decades.
Turkey has been building mosques worldwide—not only in Central Asia but also in Africa and Europe. From the perspective of “soft power,” raising national interests is considered one objective. In other words, rather than “hard power” such as military or economic strength, mosque construction is used as 1 means of enhancing national power through culture and image. Other donor countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are likewise thought to have the expansion of their own influence in the background of their support. Moreover, given the confrontation between Qatar and Turkey on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other, and the fact that they carry their rivalries abroad in efforts to project their authority, they also appear to be competing for allies and influence in Central Asia.
The Taliban and Central Asia
In the long history of the relationship between Islam and the state, the Taliban is an actor whose presence in the region cannot be ignored. The Taliban is an armed group organized around 1994 near the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, seeking to enforce strict Islam, at a time when armed clashes were frequent in Afghanistan as part of power struggles. As noted at the outset, in 2021 in 8月 the Taliban captured the capital of Afghanistan and seized power. This is the Taliban’s 2nd time in power in Afghanistan; the 1st time was from 1996 to 2001. Central Asian countries initially expressed concern about the first Taliban regime and supported the previous government, taking a reluctant stance toward relations with the Taliban from the outset. With the exception of neutral Turkmenistan, the other 4 countries expressed concerns about deteriorating security and opposed the Taliban regime; in particular, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan supported armed groups in Afghanistan composed mainly of Tajiks and Uzbeks—minorities closely connected to them—to fight the Taliban.
By contrast, in response to the current Taliban regime, Central Asian governments have taken a different stance. The other 4 countries, except Tajikistan, sent delegations to Afghanistan early on to meet representatives of the Taliban government. While they have not clearly recognized the Taliban as the official government, they are already making close contacts. Behind this is an economic calculus: gaining benefits from trade with Afghanistan and trade with South Asia and beyond via Afghanistan.
For example, even before the Taliban retook power, Uzbekistan had been expanding its economic ties with Afghanistan—not only trade, but also aiming to open railways to improve connectivity with South Asia and to have Uzbek companies build infrastructure such as Afghan roads. Kazakhstan dispatched a delegation to discuss bilateral trade about 1 month after the Taliban’s victory announcement, and then 3 days later resumed exports. Furthermore, pipeline projects for natural gas and electricity are moving ahead in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, and despite the change of government, Afghanistan remains an important trading partner.
Among the 5 Central Asian countries, Tajikistan is the only one that has not held official talks with the Taliban. Tajikistan also has economic ties with Afghanistan. However, President Emomali Rahmon has criticized the Taliban government for not including Tajik Afghans among its members. Tajikistan has stated that it fears these minorities will be persecuted by the Taliban. It is also undeniable that Rahmon’s stance reflects a calculation to harness Tajik nationalist sentiment at home and abroad and secure a support base by winning the backing of Tajiks.
Another concern for the Tajik government is the cooperative relationship between the Taliban and Jamaat Ansarullah, an extremist group active mainly in Tajikistan that the Tajik government designates as a “terrorist organization” of concern. Although both the Taliban and Tajikistan have increased fighters near the border, an actual clash is considered unlikely. Aside from President Rahmon, other senior officials have avoided direct criticism of the Taliban, and certain economic activities continue with Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
For the Central Asian states, current concerns arising from the Taliban’s seizure of power are likely less about direct danger than about indirectly energizing other extremist groups and anti-government forces. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan was aided by public dissatisfaction with the previous regime’s flawed and corrupt politics. Such dissatisfaction can also be found in Central Asian countries. While gauging their distance from the Taliban, they are increasing vigilance through measures such as more joint military exercises with Russia and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (※5), made up of former Soviet republics, and with China.
Major powers exerting influence
The United States, which bears part of the responsibility for the chain of events, has in this latest Taliban takeover limited itself to limited involvement such as calls to ensure the safety of refugees from Afghanistan. But it is not uninterested in Central Asia, as evidenced by its years-long presence in Afghanistan. Behind this are aims to prevent Russia and China from expanding their influence in Central Asia and to increase its own, and to curb the spread of groups labeled as “Islamic extremists” as a security goal. It is also thought to have economic interests in the region’s fossil fuels, such as oil and natural gas.
In relation to groups labeled “Islamic extremists,” the United States had cooperative ties before the Taliban rose in Afghanistan. From 1979 to 1989, it provided funding and military assistance to the anti-government “Islamic extremist” “Mujahideen” fighters, to oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, continuing until the Soviets withdrew. During the previous Taliban regime, however, because the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden—the central figure held responsible for the 2001/9 September 11 attacks—without conditions, the United States and its allies intervened militarily in Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime. Thereafter, U.S. forces remained stationed in Afghanistan and also used bases in Central Asian countries for military operations in Afghanistan. But in light of growing public opposition in both the United States and Afghanistan to the extended presence, U.S. forces fully withdrew from Afghanistan on 2021年8月30日.
U.S. forces patrolling the skies over Afghanistan (Photo: The U.S. Army / Flickr [CC BY 2.0])
By contrast, Russia has shown active moves following the Taliban’s return to power. Having strengthened its influence in Central Asia since the Soviet collapse, Russia has not openly criticized the Taliban regime. However, military exercises in Central Asia have increased: the Russia-led CSTO held joint drills with Kazakh forces in Kyrgyzstan in early 2021/9, and in Tajikistan in late 10月 of the same year as well. The Taliban regime’s presence can be seen as an opportunity for further expanding Russian influence in Central Asian countries that rely on Russia’s military power. At the same time, given Russia’s experience with war in Afghanistan and the Chechen conflicts (※6), the presence of “Islamic extremists” is also a worrisome factor to be guarded against.
Like Russia, China has increased military exercises and related activities in Central Asia. Citing concerns about “Islamic extremism,” China is said to have pursued policies such as detaining over a million Muslim minorities—Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz—in re-education camps in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Toward the Taliban government, China has demanded it sever ties with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an anti-government organization advocating independence for East Turkestan (Xinjiang), in exchange for economic cooperation. The aim is said to be to prevent such extremists from flowing into Xinjiang from Afghanistan. China is also supporting the development of military facilities and security infrastructure in Central Asian countries to prevent them from becoming havens for Uighurs fleeing China. Central Asian states are economically dependent on China, and to suppress the activities of extremist groups that threaten the positions of their leaders, ties have been growing both in security and economic terms, making China an actor that neither the Central Asian countries nor the Taliban can ignore.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow (Photo: Пресс-служба Президента Российской Федерации / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 4.0])
Conclusion
As we have seen, Islam in Central Asia has always been at the mercy of power. Amid political calculations and power struggles, Islam has faced various interventions, and believers have been deprived of the freedom to practice their faith. By attaching the label “Islam” to organizations that use violence and to extremist groups deemed threats by the state, interventions in Islam on security grounds have effectively justified interference even in purely religious practice. Through the relationship between Central Asia and Islam, we should reconsider the appropriate distance between the state or power and religion.
※1 Misunderstandings sometimes conflate Islam and Muslims with extremism. People belonging to groups labeled “Islamic extremists” seek to spread what they believe to be Islamic ideas through terrorism and violence. However, most Muslim clerics consider such violence to be contrary to Islamic teachings, and it is not supported by the vast majority of Muslims.
※2 Islamic dynasties is a broad term for states ruled by Muslim emperors or kings. Their origin is traced to the conquest of Mecca by Muhammad, the founder of Islam. From 632, after Muhammad’s death, caliphs (supreme leaders) chosen by Muslims carried out large-scale conquests. This caliphal rule chosen by Muslims is called the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and lasted until 661. Thereafter, the Umayyads ruled from 661 to 750, and the Abbasids from 750 to 1258, mainly centered on the Arabian Peninsula. Subsequent periods saw repeated fragmentation and state formation, and various Islamic dynasties arose in different regions.
※3 The hijab is a cloth worn by some Muslim women that covers the head and body. While not strictly defined in the Qur’an, the hijab is considered to be based on the Qur’an, and Muslims who are strict in observance are thought to wear it. Approaches to the hijab vary by country and era; in some cases, non-wearing is encouraged in the name of women’s liberation, while in others it is mandated.
※4 The Hadith—sayings of the Prophet Muhammad—include references to beards, and some Muslims believe men should trim the mustache and grow the beard on the chin accordingly. Like women’s hijab, men growing a beard is also regarded as a marker of strict religiosity.
※5 The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a military alliance among former Soviet states led by Russia. As of 2022/1, the member states are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan—6 countries. Uzbekistan withdrew in 2012, but was invited to the summit in 2021/8 in light of the situation in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whose militaries are relatively small within Central Asia, rely on the CSTO peacekeeping forces and Russian support.
※6 The Chechen conflicts were two wars between the Chechen Republic, which sought independence from the Russian Federation, and Russia—from 1994 to 1996 (First Chechen War) and again from 1999 (Second Chechen War). From the first conflict onward, Chechnya is said to have received funding from Islamic organizations. “Islamic extremism” continued to spread, and at the start of the second conflict, Chechnya was arguably aiming in practical terms to establish an Islamic state.
Writer: Yumi Ariyoshi
Graphics: Yumi Ariyoshi
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