Tensions among neighboring countries around an island in the Red Sea, which lies between Africa and the Middle East, have risen since late 2017. It began with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Sudan in December 2017. During this historic visit—the first to Sudan by a Turkish prime minister since Sudan’s independence in 1956—the two countries signed 13 agreements related to trade and security cooperation. Among them was a provision leasing Sudan’s Suakin Island on the Red Sea to Turkey for 99 years for redevelopment by Turkey. Following the announcement, countries in the region, concerned that the redevelopment might be part of Turkey’s expansion of military power in Africa, quickly voiced displeasure and took countermeasures. Neighboring Egypt, worried about Turkey’s expanding influence around the Red Sea, sent troops to a United Arab Emirates (UAE) base in Eritrea; Sudan countered by closing the eastern border at Kassala with Eritrea and deploying troops. The agreement over Suakin Island triggered a chain of additional military deployments along the Red Sea coast. Why did a situation arise that drew in surrounding countries such as Egypt, Eritrea, and the UAE, beyond the parties directly involved—Turkey and Sudan? The answer lies in a mix of historical backgrounds and political calculations, making it hard to explain from a single perspective. By focusing on events and relationships among states around the Red Sea, we will now unravel the complex reasons behind the current rise in tensions.

Suakin Island on the Red Sea coast. It once flourished as a transshipment point for trade. (Photo: Bertramz [CC BY 3.0])

Why is Suakin Island an issue?

Along the elongated Red Sea coast, south of the aforementioned Egypt and Sudan lie Eritrea and Djibouti, and on the Arabian Peninsula are Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. For geographical reasons, the region has served as a hub for trade between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Trade through the Red Sea currently accounts for about 10% of global maritime trade, and with estimates that the populations of the littoral states will double by 2050, the area’s future prospects and importance are expected to grow, with trade volumes projected to increase further.

Developments in the Red Sea—an area deemed important for both economic and political reasons in the Middle East and Africa—are complex. The stage for the latest rise in tensions is Suakin Island, but what kind of island is it? Located on the western shore of the Red Sea, Suakin is now part of Sudan, but tracing its history back to the 16th century, after Portugal dominated the Red Sea coast, the Ottoman Empire took control of much of East Africa, and Suakin remained under Ottoman administration until the late 19th century. As a transshipment point for trade among the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and India, Suakin also had fortifications built for regional security. It later underwent changes in rule under Egypt and Britain and declined, and with Sudan’s independence in 1956 it became Sudanese territory.

The stated goal of the Sudan–Turkey agreement on Suakin is to revive the island’s historic heritage to facilitate pilgrimage to Mecca by Muslims from Africa and to boost tourism. However, there are also claims that Turkey is secretly moving to establish a military foothold on Suakin. Turkey has long sought to raise its profile in Africa and along the Red Sea and already maintains bases in Somalia and Qatar. In response to such moves by Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are hardening their opposition, seeing a new security threat along the Red Sea coast.

Turkey has been actively building ties with African countries. In addition to Sudan this time, President Erdogan also visited Somalia. (Photo: AMISOM Public Information [CC0 1.0])

Territorial and water issues along the Red Sea coast

Behind this backlash lies not only Suakin but also a longstanding territorial dispute between Egypt and Sudan. The Hala’ib Triangle is a roughly 20,000 km² triangular area on the Red Sea coast along their border. After the 22nd parallel north was set as the border in 1889, Britain—the de facto colonial power—drew a new administrative boundary in 1902, placing the area under Sudan’s administration on the grounds that it was geographically and culturally closer to Sudan. The existence of these two lines sparked competing claims after Sudan’s independence. The Hala’ib Triangle’s oil and mineral wealth has further aggravated the issue. Egypt has exercised effective control over the area for about 20 years, but Sudan continues to claim sovereignty, and the dispute remains unresolved.

In addition to the territorial issue, a project in East Africa poses a threat to Egypt: Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Under construction since April 2011 in the Benishangul region about 40 km from the Sudanese border, the dam will be Africa’s largest hydropower plant, capable of supplying electricity across the Nile basin and dramatically alleviating Ethiopia’s water and power shortages.

While the project is crucial for Ethiopia’s development, other countries that share the Nile are deeply anxious. Egypt, which relies on the Nile for the bulk of its water supply, is particularly concerned. Since the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Egypt has enjoyed the lion’s share of Nile waters, and even after a new agreement between Egypt and Sudan, its predominant vested rights were preserved. Once the dam is completed, Egypt’s share of Nile water is expected to fall sharply, with direct impacts on agriculture and hydropower. To safeguard its water security, Egypt has sought World Bank mediation and pursued talks with Ethiopia and Sudan.

Construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is already under way. (Photo: Jacey Fortin [CC BY-SA 4.0])

Sudan, for its part, initially opposed the project but switched to support once it recognized the benefits. It judged that the dam would mitigate the flooding Sudan has long suffered and lead to increased agricultural output. Like Ethiopia, Sudan also stood to gain from a more reliable supply of much-needed electricity.

As such, relations among countries around the Red Sea are highly sensitive and volatile. In addition to chronic issues rooted in history, projects and events driven by third countries can abruptly reshape ties among the parties. In the case of Egypt and Sudan, already strained by a territorial dispute, the planned redevelopment of Suakin, which would draw Sudan and Turkey closer, further soured Sudan–Egypt relations. The Ethiopian dam project has likewise altered the distance between Ethiopia and each of Egypt and Sudan.

Relationships among Middle Eastern and African countries

Moreover, the calculations of countries around the Red Sea or in the Middle East that are not directly involved have added fuel to the tension. For example, Eritrea, sandwiched between Sudan and Ethiopia, gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year struggle, but a border war that killed more than 80,000 people raged from 1998 to 2000, and tensions remain high. Eritrea, which continues to be ruled autocratically and generate an international refugee crisis, hosts a large UAE naval port and airfield built at Assab in the south. The UAE, actively expanding bases in neighboring countries, maintains facilities not only in Eritrea but also in Somaliland and Yemen. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has pursued security coordination with Egypt in the Gulf region against the backdrop of worsening relations with Iran. As symbolized by Egypt’s deployment of troops to Eritrea with UAE support following the Turkey–Sudan deal, the UAE, Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia, each driven by its own political calculus, strengthened cooperation with Egypt and intervened in Red Sea coastal affairs, further complicating the situation.

On the other hand, Qatar—at odds with Saudi Arabia and the UAE—has been strengthening its political and economic ties with Sudan. Turkey, like the UAE seeking to expand its influence around the Red Sea, is also expected to deepen cooperation with Sudan following their security agreement. Ethiopia has long had poor relations with Eritrea, but maintains good ties with Sudan. The cooperative alignment among Turkey, Qatar, Sudan, and Ethiopia has been shaped by political dynamics in the Middle East and can be seen as another coalition operating along the Red Sea coast.

A clear example of the difference between these two groupings is their relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious movement influential in the Middle East and North Africa. Sudan, Turkey, and Qatar are relatively tolerant toward the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas in Egypt the Brotherhood, which briefly held power after the Arab Spring, is regarded by the current government as a major threat, prompting much criticism of the tolerant stance taken by countries like Sudan.

What lies ahead

As seen above, Egypt–Sudan relations are shaped not only by bilateral interests but also by ties with surrounding states, raising concerns of escalation. But is an armed clash likely? For now, many believe the likelihood is low. One reason is the severe domestic economic problems both countries face. Egypt’s key tourism industry has slumped due to recent terrorism, while it also struggles with intensifying conflict in the Sinai Peninsula and instability in neighboring Libya. Sudan used to produce significant oil, but most of it lay in the south; after South Sudan’s independence, Sudan’s oil revenues plunged. This decline in economic power has also prompted Sudan to strengthen ties with Middle Eastern countries such as Qatar.

Egyptian troops being deployed. A chain of military deployments along the Red Sea coast ensued. (Photo: Sherif9282 [CC BY-SA 3.0])

Although the instability in relations has not been fully dispelled, since late January 2018 Egypt and Sudan have shown signs of rapprochement. The possible return of the Sudanese ambassador to Cairo has been hinted at, and a meeting of representatives from Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project was held.

However, as the Suakin development plan—linking Turkey, far from the Red Sea, with Sudan on its shores—spilled over to involve neighboring countries, it is hard to foresee how a single event might ripple through political dynamics and alliances in the Middle East and Africa, given the complexity of the backgrounds and relationships involved. The situation is fluid and could have unforeseen, wide-ranging, and serious consequences. The future moves of the Red Sea littoral states must be watched closely, with attention to shifting inter-state connections from multiple angles.

Writer: Saya Miura

Graphic: Hinako Hosokawa