At the beginning of 2024, Tunisian lawyer and media critic Sonia Dahmani was arrested. The incident sent shockwaves through the country’s legal and journalistic circles. The fact that she was detained after publicly criticizing the authorities was widely interpreted as one of the signs that Tunisia—once hailed as the sole democratic success story of the Arab Spring—has entered a new era of political repression. For many people living in Tunisia, this case symbolized the shrinking space for critical speech against the government and the revival of practices long characteristic of the authoritarian regime that existed before 2011.

Fifteen years after the revolution that toppled Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia now stands at a crucial crossroads. Economic hardship, political disillusionment, and institutional breakdown have combined to produce an unprecedented concentration of power under President Kais Saied. What began in 2021 as an exceptional response to political deadlock has evolved into a fundamental transformation of the national political system. This article traces developments in Tunisia from independence to the current crisis, examining how the hopes raised by the 2011 Jasmine Revolution exposed the fragility of democracy and ultimately paved the way for authoritarian tendencies. It also focuses on the shifts in power, the failed transition to post-revolution democracy, and the socio‑economic conditions that once enabled national consensus, in order to understand why Tunisia has reached this point and what is now at stake for the country’s future.

Street view of Tunis, the capital of Tunisia (Photo: Stephen Downes / Flickr [CC BY-NC 2.0])

From Authoritarianism to Revolution (1956–2011)

After independence, Tunisia entered a long period of authoritarian rule, marking the beginning of a political system that would last for more than half a century. Bourguiba established a strong presidential system and became widely known as the “father of the nation.” His rule was initially characterized by ambitious modernization projects, including the expansion of education, improvements in public health, and groundbreaking reforms of women’s rights through the Code of Personal Status. These reforms enabled Tunisia to lead many other Arab countries and contributed to advancing state‑led modernization ideals. Over time, however, Bourguiba’s rule became increasingly authoritarian. Political pluralism was strictly curtailed, opposition forces were sidelined, and power became concentrated in the presidency.

In 1987, Bourguiba was removed from office in what then‑Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali dubbed a “medical coup.” Ben Ali initially promised democratic reforms, political openness, and respect for human rights. These pledges were soon betrayed. His regime morphed into a highly repressive police state characterized by censorship, extensive surveillance, arbitrary arrests, and systematic human rights abuses. Politicians, journalists, and activists who opposed the regime were silenced, while corruption spread within the ruling elite. Although Tunisia experienced economic growth between 1987 and 2011, the benefits were unevenly distributed. Wealth accumulated among elites close to the regime, while youth unemployment and regional disparities worsened. Beneath the image of a stable Tunisia often lauded abroad, public frustration was steadily building.

The Jasmine Revolution and the Promise of Democracy (2010–2014)

The frustrations that had accumulated among the population exploded in December 2010, when street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire. His act came to symbolize the humiliation, economic hardship, and lack of dignity that many Tunisians felt in their daily lives. What began as localized protests quickly spread across the country. On 14 January 2011, after weeks of mass demonstrations, Tunisians took to the streets on an unprecedented scale to demand freedom, dignity, and social justice. Young people, organizing at the grassroots and via social media, played a central role in these protests. Confronted with mounting pressure, President Ben Ali fled the country, bringing an end to his 23‑year dictatorship.

Flags bearing portraits of Ben Ali hanging in the streets of Tunis (Photo: mimi anderson / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

The chain of events in Tunisia came to be known as the “Jasmine Revolution” and marked the beginning of what would later be called the “Arab Spring.” The uprising in Tunisia inspired similar movements across the region, particularly in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. During this period, Tunisia became a symbol of democratic hope in the Arab world. In the years that followed, the country embarked on a democratic transition that was widely praised by international monitoring organizations. The new constitution adopted in 2014 guaranteed fundamental freedoms, enshrined the separation of powers, and strengthened judicial independence. Democratic elections were held, and institutions were established to enable peaceful transfers of power and a pluralist political system.

Moreover, Tunisia’s democratic transition was underpinned not only by institutional reform but also by an exceptionally vibrant civil society. Trade unions, bar associations, human rights organizations, and grassroots movements played key roles in mediating political conflicts and preventing institutional collapse. In particular, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) assumed a central role during times of crisis. In 2013, following the assassinations of left‑wing politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, the country teetered on the brink of violent polarization. Mass protests, political deadlock, and rising insecurity placed the entire transition process in jeopardy. In response, the UGTT, together with the Tunisian Bar Association, the Tunisian League of Human Rights, and the employers’ federation UTICA, launched the “National Dialogue Quartet.” This initiative facilitated negotiations between rival political forces and ultimately led to the formation of a technocratic government tasked with overseeing new elections. The National Dialogue Quartet’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 symbolized international recognition of Tunisia’s consensus‑based approach to crisis management.

In this way, the revolution succeeded in dismantling authoritarian rule and establishing democratic institutions. However, it postponed addressing the deeper structural and socio‑economic challenges the country faced.

Scene from protests in Tunisia in 2011 (Photo: raphaelthelen / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 2.0])

Post‑Revolution Disillusionment (2014–2019)

Despite these achievements, structural weaknesses persisted beneath the surface. The political system established after 2011 was marked by fragmentation and chronic instability. The new electoral law splintered the parliament, resulting in fragile coalition governments that struggled to govern effectively. The Islamist party Ennahda played a central role in the transition and repeatedly emphasized its commitment to democracy, yet it also became a focal point of political polarization. For its supporters, Ennahda represented political inclusion after decades of repression. For its critics, it appeared as an ideologically ambiguous opportunistic party that came to symbolize responsibility for economic stagnation. Over time, the line between ideological conflict and dissatisfaction with living conditions grew increasingly blurred.

Meanwhile, economic policy remained largely unchanged from the pre‑2011 era. Structural reforms were repeatedly postponed due to political calculations and social resistance. State‑owned enterprises continued to drain public finances, and the informal economy expanded. While foreign governments praised Tunisia’s democratization, they remained cautious about providing large‑scale economic assistance without clear commitments to economic reform, a stance they did not abandon. The gap between expanding political freedoms and a stagnant economy gradually eroded public confidence in democratic institutions. By the late 2010s, voter turnout had plummeted, and surveys revealed deep mistrust of political parties, parliament, and the broader political class as a whole. Democracy, once associated with dignity and renewal, increasingly became linked in people’s minds with instability and decline.

Successive governments struggled to address deeply rooted economic and social problems. Unemployment remained high, particularly among university‑educated youth, while inflation, rising public debt, and declining purchasing power fueled social discontent. Regional disparities also persisted, especially between the interior regions—epicenters of the 2011 uprisings—and the more developed coastal areas along the Mediterranean.

Politically, post‑revolution Tunisia remained fragmented, and coalition governments found it difficult to maintain stable rule. Frequent changes in leadership and an inefficient institutional framework generated a sense of political paralysis. Declining voter turnout and reduced civic participation reflected the widening disconnect between post‑revolution institutions and citizens who felt their expectations had been betrayed.

A man sitting in front of posters for Tunisia’s 2014 elections (Photo: Atlantic Council / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

The Rise of Kais Saied and the Collapse of the Post‑Revolution Order (2019–2022)

Amid widespread disillusionment with post‑revolution stagnation, Kais Saied rose to power. Elected president by a landslide in 2019, Saied was an independent constitutional law professor with no prior experience in executive office. He presented himself as a political outsider and ran on a platform of moral integrity, popular sovereignty, and the removal of a corrupt elite. His austere personal image and simple lifestyle resonated with voters worn out by years of political infighting and unfulfilled promises.

From the outset of his presidency, tensions between Saied and parliament as well as successive governments exposed a deep institutional crisis. On 25 July 2021, Tunisia entered a new and highly controversial phase. Citing Article 80 of the 2014 constitution, President Saied announced the suspension of parliament, the lifting of parliamentary immunity, and the concentration of executive and legislative powers in his own hands. He justified these measures as necessary to save the state from imminent danger, pointing to political deadlock, corruption, and economic collapse. Some welcomed this move as a decisive response to years of dysfunction. Others immediately warned that it was a constitutional coup and a dangerous concentration of power. As the state of emergency was repeatedly extended and democratic safeguards were weakened, international monitors and human rights groups voiced growing concern.

In 2022, President Saied pushed through a new constitution via referendum. The new text dramatically expanded presidential powers, reduced the role of parliament, and weakened institutional checks and balances. Although a large majority of those who voted approved the document, turnout was historically low, raising serious questions about its democratic legitimacy.

Kais Saied, who became Tunisia’s president in 2019 (Photo: Houcemmzoughi / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 4.0])

Intensifying Authoritarianism and Political Repression (2022–2024)

Following the adoption of the new constitution, Tunisia’s political system underwent a rapid shift toward authoritarian entrenchment. Institutions designed to constrain executive power were gradually neutered. After being suspended, parliament was effectively reduced to a hollow shell, and parliamentary elections held under the new framework saw record‑low turnout, reflecting the fact that many citizens had withdrawn from political participation. Numerous parties boycotted the elections entirely, arguing that the new system stripped parliament of meaningful authority and reduced elections to a symbolic ritual. As a result, the political arena became increasingly empty, dominated by individuals loyal to the president and figures with no broad national constituency.

One of the institutions most severely affected was the judiciary, long considered a pillar of Tunisia’s democratic transition. The dissolution of the Supreme Judicial Council and the dismissal of judges accused of corruption or disloyalty undermined judicial independence. The courts increasingly became tools of political repression, with a growing number of civilians being tried in military courts for various offenses. Vaguely worded charges such as “conspiracy,” “threats to national security,” and “spreading false information” were used to silence critics. The so‑called “conspiracy against state security” case epitomizes this authoritarian trend: dozens of political figures—including party leaders, former ministers, lawyers, and activists—were indicted for allegedly seeking to destabilize the state, with many of the trials conducted without publicly disclosed evidence. International NGOs have argued that these prosecutions are politically motivated rather than grounded in law, heightening fears of a return to pre‑2011 authoritarian practices.

At the same time, restrictions on freedom of expression have tightened. A decree criminalizing the spread of “false information” has been used to target journalists, bloggers, and social media users who criticize the authorities. Social media, which played a crucial role in the 2011 uprisings, has become a site of surveillance and repression. Several journalists have faced legal harassment, travel bans, and detention, fostering a climate of self‑censorship. In 2024, the arrest of lawyer and media commentator Sonia Dahmani on charges of insulting the state drew sharp criticism from human rights organizations and press‑freedom advocates. These groups condemned her arrest as a warning to government opponents and a symbol of the shrinking space for civil society.

During this period, the role of the security apparatus also changed. While the military has officially remained neutral and largely withdrawn from direct political structures, the powers of the police have expanded. Warrantless arrests, nighttime raids, and prolonged pre‑trial detention have become more frequent. Human rights organizations have documented police conduct reminiscent of pre‑revolution practices, warning of institutional backsliding. In their daily lives, many Tunisians feel that the climate of fear they believed had vanished after 2011 has returned.

Former building of the Administrative Court in Tunis (Photo: Sami Mlouhi / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 4.0])

Economic Burden, Social Discontent, and Public Exhaustion (2022–2024)

This repression has unfolded against a backdrop of acute social and economic distress. Years of low growth were exacerbated by the COVID‑19 pandemic in 2020 and by global inflationary pressures, leaving the government struggling to finance basic imports and public services. Shortages of subsidized goods such as bread, sugar, and fuel became increasingly frequent, while hospitals faced shortages of essential medicines. Wages in the public sector—long a pillar of social stability—came under pressure as negotiations with trade unions stalled.

Socially, the protracted crisis has accelerated both emigration and political disengagement. Thousands of young people have left the country in search of job opportunities abroad, often via irregular migration routes, reflecting a profound loss of confidence in the country’s future. At home, protests against unemployment, water shortages, and soaring prices have erupted sporadically but increasingly encountered repression or indifference. For many citizens, economic survival has taken precedence over political engagement. In this climate, Saied’s portrayal of his opponents as corrupt elites or foreign agents has appealed to people who feel excluded from the post‑revolution order.

Unemployment has remained high, particularly among university graduates. At the same time, inflation, rising public debt, and falling purchasing power have stoked social unrest. In many cases, declining political participation has stemmed not only from fear of repression but also from sheer exhaustion. For wide segments of society, survival has replaced civic engagement as the primary concern. Together, economic hardship, social fatigue, and the consolidation of authoritarian rule have further eroded the hopes for the future and the aspirations for democracy that flourished in the immediate post‑revolution years.

A sparsely populated street in Tunis (Photo: Marc Barrot / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0])

Tunisia at a Crossroads

From 2021 to 2026, Tunisia has entered one of the most critical turning points in its modern history. Saied’s rule, built on populist rhetoric and unprecedented concentration of power, has unraveled many of the democratic gains achieved after the 2011 revolution. His supporters argue that strong leadership is necessary to restore order, while his opponents fear that Tunisia is relapsing into authoritarianism. This crisis has continued beyond 2024. By late 2025, major demonstrations had broken out in several cities, including Tunis, to protest the government’s repression of opponents and journalists. Protesters demanded the release of political prisoners and respect for civil liberties. Social and economic grievances have also fueled unrest—from public health emergencies in regions like Gabès to labor mobilization, including a nationwide strike in early 2026 called by Tunisia’s largest trade union. These developments underscore that political repression and social discontent are not relics of the past but ongoing realities.

Tunisia’s trajectory also carries implications for the broader region. The country’s backsliding—after years of being regarded as the sole successful case of democratization to emerge from the Arab Spring—has intensified skepticism about democratic transitions across the Middle East and North Africa. Multiple scenarios remain possible for Tunisia’s future, ranging from the consolidation of authoritarian rule to renewed social unrest driven by economic hardship. Yet in the absence of a strong opposition and an inclusive political dialogue, the future remains highly uncertain.

Tunisia’s democratic regression also raises broader questions about the relationship between democracy and socio‑economic performance. The country’s political and economic trajectory since 2011 suggests that political freedoms alone are not enough to sustain the legitimacy of democracy if they are not accompanied by tangible improvements in everyday life. Saied’s rise and consolidation of power cannot be understood solely as a top‑down authoritarian move; they are also the product of widespread disillusionment with a decade of unmet expectations. This structural context complicates simplistic external responses. Criticism from abroad over democratic backsliding often clashes with domestic narratives centered on dignity, sovereignty, and opposition to what is perceived as elite failure.

The city of Tunis, where tradition and modernity intersect (Photo: Travel-Fr / Shutterstock.com)

Writer: Yosr Laarifi

Graphics: Yumi Ariyoshi

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