15 April 2026 marks exactly three years since armed conflict broke out in Sudan. It is still considered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. One cause of this conflict lies in the country’s instability, the build-up of dissatisfaction with the government, and the delegation of the use of violence to non-state actors. The fragile, civilian-led government that was launched in 2019 was ousted in 2021 by two factions of the military. These two factions are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the regular national army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful militia organization. The two fell out and clashed in 2023, leading to the current conflict.
However, calling this conflict a “civil war” obscures the reality on the ground. The conflict is tied to rivalries between neighboring countries, and powerful external backers play a crucial role in sustaining the fighting. There is no prospect of a decisive victory, and no military solution is in sight. Diplomatic efforts have also yet to achieve any substantial progress.
The historical background of the conflict is introduced in another GNV article. As the conflict enters its fourth year, this article presents an overview of the situation.
WFP aid delivered from Chad to Darfur, 2024 (Photo: WFP / Sylvain Barral)
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Military perspective
The conflict in Sudan erupted suddenly, and intense fighting was initially concentrated around the capital, Khartoum. The fighting largely split the country in two, with the SAF taking control of most of the east and the RSF dominating the west. At the outset, the RSF appeared to have the upper hand, and the SAF was forced in mid-2023 to move most of its command structure from the capital to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan. However, a SAF counteroffensive launched in late 2024 recaptured most of Khartoum and the neighboring cities of Omdurman and Bahri by early 2025.
Meanwhile, the RSF continued to consolidate its control over the west, particularly in its traditional stronghold of Darfur. The RSF surrounded the SAF’s last remaining stronghold in the North Darfur state capital of El Fasher and, after an 18‑month siege, captured the city in October 2025. Other armed groups, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), are also active in Darfur. Since then, fighting has intensified in North and South Kordofan states.
The conflict has also drawn in neighboring countries and external powers. For example, fighting between the SAF and RSF has sporadically spilled over into Chad, which closed its border with Sudan in February 2026. The RSF has also faced accusations that parts of the territory it controls along the Ethiopian border were used to launch drone strikes from inside Ethiopia in 2026, and that it maintains bases there. Another armed group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement‑North (SPLM‑N), which is linked to the ruling party in neighboring South Sudan, has allied with the RSF, heightening tensions between the SAF and South Sudan.
The movement of fighters and weapons around the region is contributing to wider tensions and instability. Libya, for instance, serves as a key transit route for weapons supplied by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a major ally of the RSF. Cross‑border alliances between non‑state groups based on ethnic ties, combined with deep poverty across the region, have encouraged the influx of mercenaries from neighboring states such as Chad. It has also been reported that the UAE has helped recruit mercenaries from Colombia to fight alongside the RSF. This reliance on mercenaries has become a major factor in the conflict.
Humanitarian perspective
The toll of the conflict in Sudan is severe. The country topped the International Rescue Committee’s annual Emergency Watchlist of countries facing the greatest humanitarian risk in 2024, 2025, and 2026.
The exact number of people killed over the three years is unknown, but a estimate at the two‑year mark put the death toll at between 150,000 and 400,000. The conflict has been marked by several large‑scale massacres, the latest occurring when the RSF captured El Fasher in October 2025. Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab, analyzing satellite imagery, concluded that “large‑scale, coordinated mass killing” can be confirmed. Over the past year, both sides have increasingly used drones, further increasing civilian casualties.
Non‑violent deaths caused by lack of food, water, and medical care clearly far exceed those caused directly by violence. As of April 2026, the World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that more than 19 million people face acute hunger and nearly two‑thirds of the population require urgent humanitarian assistance. Community kitchens operating around the country are a lifeline for many, but in April 2026 it was reported that 42% of these kitchens had been forced to close over the previous six months due to funding shortages.
Meanwhile, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that as of December 2025, 3.2 million people had fled to neighboring countries and 10.1 million were displaced within Sudan. The total number of displaced people is equivalent to roughly a quarter of the country’s population, leaving Sudan with the world’s worst displacement crisis.
Sexual violence has also surged with the conflict. A 2026 study by UN Women found that the number of women and girls reporting experiences of sexual violence was four times higher than before the war and twice as high as one year into the conflict.
War‑scarred Khartoum, May 2023 (Photo: Abd_Almohimen_Sayed / Shutterstock.com)
Economic perspective
The conflict has dealt a devastating blow to Sudan’s economy, which was already in dire straits before the war began. One estimate suggests that by 2025 the economy had shrunk by up to 42%, causing the loss of millions of jobs and a sharp drop in household income. A more recent report jointly released in 2026 by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) notes that Sudan’s income per capita has fallen back to 1992 levels, while extreme poverty has worsened beyond the levels of the 1980s.
Since the loss of oil revenues following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Sudan’s economy has relied largely on agriculture. However, many of the millions who have fled their homes due to the conflict are people who would otherwise be working in agriculture. Even those who have managed to stay on their land face severe restrictions in accessing agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, as well as markets where they can sell their produce.
This disruption has caused food shortages for domestic consumption and has driven rapid inflation. It has also affected agricultural products that were key export earners. One particularly notable example is gum arabic, widely used as an emulsifier and stabilizer in the food and beverage industry, for which Sudan has traditionally been one of the world’s leading producers.
Sudan is also rich in mineral resources, especially gold, but the conflict has severed formal mining and export routes. Gold has become a critical element of the war economy, with much of it being smuggled out of the country. A substantial volume is believed to be routed to the UAE via the RSF, while the SAF is reported to be smuggling gold to Egypt. As a result, very little of the wealth generated by gold appears to be reaching the Sudanese people.
Bagged gum arabic, before the outbreak of the conflict (Photo: World Bank Photo Collection / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])
Political perspective
Since the fall of Omar al‑Bashir, who ruled for 30 years until he was ousted in 2019, Sudan’s political power has been the subject of ongoing struggle. While his departure was driven largely by popular protests, the final blow came from the military, which staged a coup. The military and civilian leaders eventually reached a power‑sharing agreement and formed a transitional government. Yet in 2021 the military carried out another coup that overthrew this transitional government. Although this was a joint move by the SAF and RSF, the two turned against each other and descended into armed conflict just 18 months later.
The conflict has effectively divided the country into spheres of influence controlled by the SAF and RSF. By recapturing Khartoum in 2025, the SAF regained de facto control of what remains of the central government, but its governing capacity is largely limited to the eastern half of the country. The SAF continues to operate institutions originally created for the transitional government, such as the former Sovereign Council. For example, in 2025, using the name of this council, a civilian “prime minister” was appointed, and this leadership appears to have gained a measure of international recognition. The RSF and its allied groups, on the other hand, announced in 2025 that they had established a parallel government for the areas they control in western Sudan.
Yet, judging from the events leading up to the war, neither the SAF nor the RSF can be said to hold legitimate political authority over the country. Since the 2021 coup, leaders of civil society have continued to press the military to relinquish power and have sought to establish a viable civilian leadership. This camp includes the grassroots coalition of civic activists known as the “Somud Alliance,” as well as figures such as Abdalla Hamdok, who served as the civilian prime minister in the 2019–2021 transitional government.
Another political force to consider is the movement linked to Sudan’s Islamists. In recent years they have increasingly aligned themselves with the SAF, apparently seeing this as an effective means of regaining some of the influence they enjoyed under the al‑Bashir regime.
Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok of the transitional government (at the time, 2019) (Photo: Ola A .Alsheikh / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 4.0])
Regional and international perspective
Some aspects of regional and international involvement have already been noted above, but they merit further elaboration.
Egypt is seen as the country that most strongly supports the SAF. It views the SAF as an ally in its rivalry with Ethiopia. Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have soured primarily over disputes concerning the Nile’s water resources, especially those associated with Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Eritrea, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are also believed to support the SAF. Saudi Arabia’s increasing support for the SAF appears to be linked to its deteriorating relationship with the UAE.
The strongest backer of the RSF is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE had forged close ties with the RSF even before the conflict erupted in 2023; in the mid‑ to late‑2010s it used RSF fighters as mercenaries during its military intervention in Yemen. The UAE, working with the non‑state Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya, has channeled military support and other supplies to the RSF. This highlights how the UAE views the RSF as a useful tool for projecting influence across borders while also enabling access to large quantities of gold. Chad, Ethiopia, and Kenya are also thought to support the RSF.
Major powers are not heavily involved, but they have an indirect impact. For instance, the close relationship between the United States and the UAE has tended to blunt international criticism of the UAE’s support for the RSF. The US decision in 2026 to designate Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization is officially presented as part of its stance toward Iran, but some see it as intended to weaken the SAF and benefit the RSF. China and Russia have avoided taking clear sides and are reported to be providing limited support to both the SAF and RSF. The European Union (EU), meanwhile, has imposed sanctions on leaders of both sides.
Is there any end in sight?
There have been several attempts at mediation and diplomatic measures to bring the conflict to a peaceful end. These include efforts by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which covers the Horn of Africa and eastern Africa, as well as by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations. At the same time, various mediation initiatives involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United Kingdom, the United States, and others have emerged over the course of the conflict.
In 2025, some of these actors joined forces to form a “Quad” grouping comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. Another framework is the “Quintet,” made up of the AU, IGAD, the EU, the Arab League, and the UN. However, neither track has produced tangible progress toward peace talks or a ceasefire.
On 15 April 2026, the EU held the third Sudan conference in Berlin, Germany, aiming to relaunch dialogue and secure humanitarian aid. Various civil‑society stakeholders were invited, but the warring parties, the SAF and RSF, were excluded, and mediation itself was not on the agenda. The conference produced about US$1.8 billion in pledges of humanitarian aid, but it remains unclear how much of the promised funding will actually materialize. Overall support has been declining; in 2025, UN agencies received only 40% of the funds they said were needed for humanitarian operations.
Moreover, following US and Israeli strikes against Iran, import delays have pushed up the prices of basic necessities such as food, fuel, and fertilizer, further underscoring the importance of humanitarian assistance.
The people of Sudan cannot wait much longer for peace.
Writer: Virgil Hawkins
Graphics: MIKI Yuna, Sara Matsumoto
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