In recent years, Vietnam has seen a series of major corruption scandals come to light. In 2025, Vietnam recorded the highest economic growth (8%) in Southeast Asia, but behind this success, corruption remains a serious and unresolved problem. International surveys and reports point out that persistent, widespread corruption is affecting economic development and policy implementation.

A national governance survey conducted in 2024 also showed that corruption is one of the public’s most important concerns and a key factor undermining social trust. In response, the Vietnamese government has in recent years launched a powerful anti‑corruption campaign. However, while its achievements are often highlighted, observers also point to institutional and structural constraints and side effects.

This article first outlines the background and reality of corruption in Vietnam, then examines the evolution and effectiveness of anti‑corruption policies, as well as their limitations.

To Lam, who assumed the presidency at the National Assembly in Hanoi, Vietnam (2024) (Photo: HYTV / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 3.0])

The structure that generates corruption

Corruption in Vietnam is not merely the result of individual misconduct, but a phenomenon rooted in the political system and economic structure. Politically, since the reunification of North and South in 1975, Vietnam has maintained a one‑party system under the Communist Party. While this system has the advantage of rapid decision‑making, limited separation of powers and weak oversight make it difficult to effectively check the executive and judiciary, thereby creating a fertile environment for corruption.

One particularly problematic aspect is the “fusion of Party and state.” Under a structure where Party decisions heavily influence the administration and judiciary, the rule of law may not fully function, and investigations and punishment of corruption cases can be swayed by political considerations. As a result, the exposure of corruption can lack consistency and have only limited deterrent effect, as some observers note.

On the economic side, the rapid marketization that followed the Doi Moi policy—an economic reform that introduced the market economy while maintaining the socialist system—has become a hotbed of corruption. With increases in foreign direct investment and expanded infrastructure development, large sums of money now move around land‑use rights allocation, construction project approvals, and transactions involving state‑owned enterprises. Because administrative officials hold licensing authority in these areas, there is a strong incentive for companies to offer bribes in order to smooth procedures.

Another factor fueling corruption is that transparency and oversight mechanisms have not kept pace with the country’s rapid economic development. For example, in the process of land expropriation and urban development, opaque decision‑making and compensation levels have become major issues, and there are reports of cases where illicit profit distribution has taken place.

In this way, corruption in Vietnam is structurally generated by the interaction between the concentration of power under its political system and the expansion of vested interests accompanying marketization.

The reality of corruption

Corruption in Vietnam ranges from small‑scale practices embedded in daily life to national‑level scandals. At the everyday level, bribery in healthcare, education, and administrative services is widely reported. For instance, there are cases where patients or their families make unofficial payments to medical staff for priority treatment or to expedite administrative procedures. Such practices are sometimes accepted among citizens as a “necessary cost,” which leads to the reproduction of corruption.

According to the 2025 edition of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, an NGO that monitors corruption worldwide, Vietnam scored 41 points, an increase of one point from the previous year, ranking 81st out of 182 countries and territories. This marks a seven‑place rise from 88th, indicating some improvement. The CPI is an index where a higher score indicates lower perceived corruption, and the result confirms Vietnam’s improving trend. In comparison with neighboring countries, Thailand’s score fell from the previous year to 33 points, and the Philippines also declined to 32 points. Against this backdrop, Vietnam shows signs of improvement, suggesting that efforts to curb corruption are having some effect.

Everyday corruption tends to worsen during emergencies. A typical example is the Viet A (Viet A) scandal that came to light between 2021 and 2022 at the height of the COVID‑19 pandemic. In this case, it was revealed that in connection with the supply of COVID‑19 test kits, the company had bribed medical institutions and government officials in multiple provinces and cities to secure contracts fraudulently. Viet A falsified its production costs by inflating the prices of raw materials and machinery used to manufacture test kits, and sold each kit at an unjustifiably high price of 470,000 dong (about 17 US dollars). During this process, bribes were allegedly paid to officials at the Ministry of Health and staff of local disease control centers to promote the sale and contracting of the test kits. The case involved numerous senior officials in the Ministry of Health and local authorities, and developed into dozens of arrests and indictments.

Vietnamese people registering for COVID‑19 rapid antigen testing in Hanoi (2020) (Photo: Truyền Hình Pháp Luật / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 3.0])

Large‑scale corruption scandals

Such large‑scale corruption scandals have not been limited to the Viet A case during the COVID‑19 pandemic; many others have been exposed since. In 2025, in a corruption case involving roughly 44 million US dollars related to public works and fund management, 41 people were convicted, among other developments, as the government has been stepping up crackdowns on business figures and civil servants in an effort to curb corruption and maintain confidence in governance.

In recent years, Vietnam has also uncovered a series of financial fraud cases worth billions of US dollars. The most high‑profile among them centers on Truong My Lan, chair of property giant Van Thinh Phat Group. This case, which surfaced in 2022, is said to dwarf the aforementioned corruption cases in scale.

Prosecutors allege that, leveraging close ties with a bank, Truong My Lan diverted enormous sums by fabricating sham projects through shell companies, thereby drawing massive loans from the bank. Because these fraudulent schemes affected the bank’s funds—effectively depositors’ money—they became a serious problem undermining confidence in the entire financial system.

The funds were allegedly transferred into accounts of so‑called “ghost companies” that had no real operations, or withdrawn in cash from bank and investor loans and investments, then diverted and used in ways that made tracking extremely difficult. The total amount of funds misappropriated through these methods is estimated at about 43 billion US dollars, of which the amount recognized as embezzled alone is reported to be around 12 billion US dollars. The core issue is that funds obtained in the form of loans and investments were not used for their stated business purposes, but instead were diverted for the private benefit of the chair and her associates. The scale of the scandal is said to amount to about 10% of Vietnam’s gross domestic product (GDP), making it one of the largest financial scandals in the country’s history.

City police in Nha Trang, Vietnam (2009) (Photo: Luther Bailey / Flickr [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0])

In April 2024, a death sentence was handed down to Truong My Lan, signaling to domestic and international audiences the Vietnamese government’s strong anti‑corruption stance. However, in 2025, Vietnam’s National Assembly amended the Penal Code to abolish the death penalty for certain economic crimes such as embezzlement, making life imprisonment the applicable maximum sentence. This has brought about a major change in how economic crimes are punished.

Thus, corruption in Vietnam exists on multiple levels, from everyday bribery to national‑scale financial scandals. The fact that corruption remains deeply entrenched despite harsh crackdowns and punishments suggests that it is not merely a matter of individual wrongdoing, but a problem embedded in institutions and structures.

Strengthening anti‑corruption policies and remaining challenges

To counter such corruption, the Vietnamese government has significantly strengthened its anti‑corruption policies in recent years. At the center of this effort is a campaign known as the “Blazing Furnace.” Launched in 2016 by then head of state Nguyen Phu Trong, this campaign has been further intensified under President and current General Secretary To Lam following Trong’s death in 2024, with a surge in the prosecution of high‑ranking officials and moves that some see as closely tied to politics.

This campaign showcases a strong stance of “thoroughly cracking down on corrupt officials” and has involved large‑scale investigations targeting numerous senior cadres. Furthermore, in 2026 the leadership set out to balance anti‑corruption measures with economic growth, announcing the continuation of the anti‑corruption drive alongside an annual GDP growth target of 10%.

Nguyen Phu Trong, head of state and General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (2014) (Photo: Presidential Press and Information Office / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 4.0])

These anti‑corruption efforts are widely regarded as having achieved a certain degree of success. In particular, the fact that corruption at the senior‑official level—previously beyond the reach of enforcement—has begun to be exposed is a significant change. At the same time, however, several serious problems have also been pointed out.

The first is administrative paralysis. As a result of strong enforcement, officials have become increasingly risk‑averse, and there are reports of delays in policy decisions and the implementation of public projects. This is because complex systems and procedures mean even minor mistakes can be pursued, and fear of political pressure or sanctions makes officials overly cautious. Such paralysis may also affect economic growth.

The second is the impact on the investment climate. While anti‑corruption efforts can improve transparency, they also have the potential to heighten political uncertainty. In particular, a string of large‑scale investigations has led some foreign firms to worry about increased risks. From the corporate perspective, this is because some investigations appear linked to political motives or power struggles, making it difficult to predict the future direction of policy.

Lastly, there is the issue of human rights. Some observers argue that recent years have seen tighter government controls on speech and crackdowns on dissidents alongside anti‑corruption policies, raising concerns that anti‑corruption measures may be used as a tool for political control, a point that is actively debated.

Why corruption does not disappear

Vietnam’s current anti‑corruption policies focus primarily on “crackdowns.” However, experts point out that such an approach has inherent limits as long as the root causes of corruption lie in institutions and social structures.

First, the concentration of power and lack of transparency remain major obstacles. Under the one‑party system of the Communist Party, decision‑making processes in Vietnam are closed, and some surveys suggest that sufficient transparency in policymaking has not been achieved.

In addition, restrictions on the role of the media and civil society make it difficult to monitor corruption. According to an analysis by Transparency International, in countries where political and civil freedoms are restricted, media and civil society organizations face limits on their ability to monitor the government, which hampers the detection and prevention of corruption. In an environment where independent media cannot function fully, whistle‑blowing and investigative journalism are constrained, raising concerns that this becomes a breeding ground for the concealment and recurrence of corruption.

Construction site linked to Truong My Lan (2024) (Photo: Remko Tanis / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0])

Furthermore, low remuneration for civil servants is also seen as one factor creating fertile ground for corruption. In Vietnam, public officials are paid less than their private‑sector counterparts, and sometimes suffer delayed payments, which, as some analysts argue, makes them more inclined to accept bribes to improve their living standards. According to the latest World Bank report, “Vietnam 2045,” experts stress that improving public‑sector pay and introducing performance‑based evaluation systems are important from the standpoint of curbing corruption.

These structural constraints indicate that measures based purely on “crackdowns” cannot eradicate corruption as a whole. A multifaceted approach is needed, including the devolution of power, institutional and transparency reforms, strengthening independent oversight bodies, and expanding the roles of civil society and the media.

Vietnam between economic growth and anti‑corruption efforts

Vietnam now faces a crucial choice between two imperatives: maintaining its political system and reforming governance. The anti‑corruption campaign has achieved some success by exposing high‑level officials and major financial scandals, thereby contributing to the government’s governing capacity and public trust. However, crackdowns alone cannot fundamentally resolve systemic corruption, and problems deeply rooted in the political system and social structure still remain.

Going forward, comprehensive reforms will be required, including easing the concentration of power, improving policy transparency, strengthening independent oversight mechanisms, and expanding the roles of civil society and the media. At the same time, in order to sustain economic growth while advancing such reforms, it will be necessary to stabilize the investment environment for businesses and minimize political uncertainty.

If corruption is reduced, it is expected to lead to further economic growth. Yet the question remains: does sufficient political will exist to correct the concentration of power?

Writer: Suren G.

Graphics: Mayuko Hanafusa