On 19 March 2026, France announced it would extend the protections of the European Social Charter — a Council of Europe treaty guaranteeing fundamental social and economic rights, including rights to housing, healthcare, and employment — to its overseas territories, effective 1 May 2026. The long awaited declaration ended an exclusion that had denied those protections to the residents of France’s overseas departments for more than six decades. Human Rights Watch (HRW), the international human rights organization, described the prior exclusion as “a legal anomaly and structural injustice.”

While France’s decision represented an important legal development, it also highlighted the extent to which the relationship between European states and their overseas territories continues to involve significant disparities in rights, political status, and economic conditions.

According to the United Nations (UN), 17 territories remain on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs) — defined under Chapter XI of the UN Charter as territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. Of those 17, 12 are administered by European states: France, the United Kingdom (UK), and Spain. Their combined populations number approximately two million people. The focus of this article is the rights, inequality, and unresolved self-determination that continue to shape the lives of the populations of Europe’s overseas territories.

Old British fort, Bermuda (Photo: olli e / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

From empire to overseas territories

The territories that remain under European administration are the surviving remnants of European colonial expansion that began in the fifteenth century. At the peak of European colonialism in the early twentieth century, the British Empire covered more than 35 million square kilometres and the French Empire approximately 13 million. The populations of these territories were subjected to systems of extraction, forced labour, and racial hierarchy whose economic and social effects persist into the present.

The formal drive for decolonization accelerated after the Second World War, largely driven by the war and its consequences. The European colonial powers were weakened through the war, including through the collapse of the French government and Japan’s occupation of British, Dutch, and other colonial possessions in Asia, exposing the vulnerability of the colonial empires. The war also created new opportunities for nationalist movements across colonized territories to organize and cooperate.

These developments, together with the principles set out in the UN Charter (1945) and growing international support for self-determination, accelerated the dismantling of colonial empires. When the UN established its original list of Non-Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs) in 1946, it included 72 territories. Most have since achieved self-government or independence, leaving only 17 territories on the UN’s list. The last territory to be removed from the list was Timor-Leste, which became independent in 2002.

The European territories that did not move towards independence were incorporated into new legal and economic frameworks developed by their administering European states. The Treaty of Rome (1957), which established the European Economic Community (EEC), also brought Europe’s overseas territories into the new framework of European integration. At France’s request, its remaining overseas territories were included in a special framework that linked them to the EEC while recognizing their distinct status. To support their economic and social development, the European Development Fund (EDF) was established to provide financial assistance to these territories.

Border between French Saint-Martin and Dutch Sint Maarten (Photo: Mark Yokoyama / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

As African territories gained independence through the 1960s and 1970s, the remaining non-independent territories gradually came to be governed under two legal categories that define their relationship with the European Union (EU): the Outermost Regions (ORs) (*1), of which there are nine, and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), which currently number thirteen (*2).

The international framework for decolonization

The international legal framework for decolonization rests principally on Chapter XI of the UN Charter and UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted on 14 December 1960. Resolution 1514 affirmed that all peoples have the right to self-determination and that “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.” Resolution 1541 (XV), adopted the following day, identified three legitimate outcomes of self-determination: independence, free association with an independent state, or integration with an independent state—provided any outcome genuinely reflects the freely expressed will of the territory’s people.

In practice, many non-sovereign territories have not viewed independence as their preferred constitutional outcome. A comparative study published in 2020 covering approximately 40 non-sovereign jurisdictions worldwide found that most of their populations preferred association with their metropolitan states over full independence due to having economic security, passport rights, and territorial protection. The study also found that this preference coexisted with widespread frustration over persistent inequality and limited political recognition. Rather than seeking formal separation, many respondents expressed a desire for what the study described as “true equality” with the metropolis.

To oversee the decolonization process, the United Nations established the Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) in 1961. It is the UN body responsible for monitoring the 17 remaining NSGTs and promoting their decolonization through annual sessions at which the states administering these territories, other UN member states, and representatives of the territories themselves may present their views. At the 2026 C-24 session, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for renewed commitment to completing the decolonization process, stating that the organization had been founded on the principle that nations should meet as equals.

Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs addressing the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, 2013 (Photo: MRECIC ARG / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 2.0])

Territories are placed on the NSGT list when the UN determines that their people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. In making that determination, the organization considers factors such as the degree of political autonomy, the ability of the population to determine its own system of government, and whether existing constitutional arrangements reflect the people’s freely expressed wishes. Differences can arise between the UN and administering states over whether a territory has attained a full measure of self-government.

One such example is French Polynesia, which was removed from the NSGT list in 1947 before being re-inscribed by the UN General Assembly in 2013. France opposed the move and boycotted C-24 sessions on French Polynesia for nearly a decade, arguing that the territory’s existing autonomy framework was sufficient. The UN General Assembly has continued to adopt annual resolutions affirming the right of the people of French Polynesia to self-determination.

Decolonization involves three principal actors: the territory, the administering state, and the UN. While the UN provides the international framework, the constitutional relationship between each territory and its administering state differs considerably. The following section examines how these differences are reflected in the EU’s classification of overseas territories.

How Europe classifies overseas territories

European states maintain a variety of constitutional relationships with their overseas territories. Within the European Union, territories associated with EU member states are classified under two principal legal frameworks: Outermost Regions (ORs) and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). These frameworks define how the territories relate to the EU and the extent to which EU law applies to them.

The ORs are formally integral parts of the EU, with full application of EU law, EU citizenship, and access to EU structural funds, including approximately €1.9 billion under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the 2021–2027 programming period. By contrast, the thirteen OCTs, which are associated with France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, are outside the EU single market—the area in which goods, services, people, and capital move freely. Although they maintain a special association with the EU, they are not part of the EU’s customs territory, and EU law generally does not apply to them. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 1 February 2020 also removed the ten British Overseas Territories (BOTs) from the OCT framework, ending their access to EU development cooperation and funding mechanisms.

Constitutional arrangements vary considerably among administering states. France applies a dual model: its overseas departments and regions follow the principle of legislative identity, under which French law applies automatically. Its overseas collectivities, including French Polynesia and New Caledonia (both located in the South Pacific), have greater legislative autonomy.

The UK grants each British Overseas Territory (BOT) its own constitution but reserves responsibility for defence, foreign affairs, and certain governance powers.

The Netherlands treats the Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten as autonomous constituent countries, while Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba, also located in the Caribbean, are special municipalities that form part of the Netherlands, with Dutch law generally applying there.

Denmark grants Greenland and the Faroe Islands extensive self-government under separate home rule and self-rule arrangements. These constitutional arrangements form the basis of the relationship between overseas territories and their administering states. The next section explores how this framework operates in practice through the case of New Caledonia.

New Caledonia: A case study of political deadlock

New Caledonia is one of the most prominent examples of the challenges surrounding decolonization in the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories. Located in the South Pacific, the archipelago was annexed by France in 1853. Its Indigenous Kanak population, which constitutes about 41% of its approximately 268,000 inhabitants, has long sought greater self-determination, while many other residents support continued association with France. Debates have focused on voting rights and the territory’s constitutional future.

New Caledonian Armed Forces (FANC) (Photo: Dana Beesley / Wikimedia Commons [Public domain])

During the 1980s, tensions over land ownership, political representation, and Kanak demands for independence escalated into violent conflict between pro-independence and pro-France groups, culminating in the 1988 Ouvéa hostage crisis. The Matignon Accords of 1988 brought an end to the violence and established a ten-year period of political and economic transition. Building on that, the Nouméa Accord of 1998 established a framework for the gradual transfer of powers to New Caledonian institutions and provided for three independence referendums.

To preserve the political balance established under the Nouméa Accord, eligibility to vote in provincial elections and the independence referendums was restricted to people with longstanding ties to New Caledonia. The first two referendums, held on 2018 and 2020, rejected independence by 56.7% and 53.3% respectively, with turnout exceeding 80% on both occasions.

The third and final referendum, held in 2021, rejected independence by 96% of votes cast. However, turnout fell to about 44%, compared with 86% in 2020, after the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) called for a boycott following a severe COVID-19 outbreak that disrupted Kanak mourning traditions. France proceeded despite the objections, and the FLNKS rejected the result as illegitimate.

Disagreement over the legitimacy of the 2021 referendum contributed to the political crisis that followed. In late 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a constitutional amendment that would allow French nationals who had lived in New Caledonia for at least ten years to vote in provincial elections, including people who had moved to the territory after 1998. The change was expected to add around 25,000 voters. FLNKS argued that the change would dilute Kanak political influence and overturn the political compromise established by the Nouméa Accord, describing it as “recolonization.” After the French National Assembly approved the amendment in May 2024, widespread civil unrest broke out.

Protestors’ barricade, New Caledonia, 2024 (Photo: Siciliathisma / Wikimedia Commons [CC0 1.0])

The unrest lasted from May through late 2024. According to French authorities, it resulted in 14 deaths and more than €2 billion in damage and severe economic disruption. New Caledonia’s economy contracted by approximately 13.5%. Hundreds of businesses were destroyed or looted, and France declared its first state of emergency in four decades on 16 May 2024 and deployed around 3,500 security personnel. The proposed constitutional amendment was later withdrawn.

Negotiations resumed in 2025. Talks held in in July in Bougival, near Paris, produced a draft agreement proposing a “State of New Caledonia“, under which the territory would remain part of France while gaining expanded powers and a distinct nationality. Although FLNKS delegates initially signed the document, they later withdrew their support, stating that it did not meet the aspirations of the Kanak people.

Political uncertainty delayed the provincial elections three times before they were finally held on 28 June 2026. The vote produced no clear majority, and negotiations over New Caledonia’s political future remain ongoing.

Comparing Europe’s remaining territories

Europe’s remaining overseas territories have followed different political paths, ranging from greater autonomy within the administering state to continued association or aspirations for independence.

Gibraltar, a British Overseas Territory on Spain’s southern coast, has been disputed by the UK and Spain since Britain acquired it under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. In a 2002 referendum, 98.5% of voters rejected a proposal for the UK and Spain to share sovereignty over the territory. Following Brexit, the UK, Spain, and the EU spent several years negotiating Gibraltar’s post-Brexit relationship before reaching a political agreement in 2025 and publishing a draft treaty in 2026.

The Falkland Islands (known in Argentina as Islas Malvinas), another British Overseas Territory in the South Atlantic, remain the subject of Argentina’s sovereignty claim. The 1982 Falklands War claimed the lives of 255 British and 650 Argentine military personnel, along with three civilians. In a 2013 referendum, 99.8% of voters chose to remain a British Overseas Territory, though Argentina does not recognize the result.

The flag of Greenland, Nuuk (Photo: Bruno Rijsman / Flickr [CC BY 4.0])

Bermuda enjoys extensive self-government within the UK. A 1995 referendum rejected independence, with around 74% voting against it. Known for its offshore financial sector and often criticized as a corporate tax haven, Bermuda’s economy is driven by international business, finance, and insurance, giving it one of the world’s highest GDPs per capita.

Aruba and Curaçao, two Caribbean islands, are constituent countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands with broad internal autonomy. While the Netherlands remains responsible for defense and foreign affairs, its interventions in local governance have periodically drawn criticism from local political leaders.

Greenland and the Faroe Islands are self-governing territories within the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland gained expanded self-rule in 2009 after a referendum, and although most political parties support eventual independence, the territory continues to rely heavily on Danish financial support. The Faroe Islands have also debated independence but remain closely linked to Denmark economically and constitutionally.

Together, these territories demonstrate that the legacy of European colonialism has produced a range of political arrangements rather than a single model for self-determination.

Economic inequality across overseas territories

Many overseas territories administered by France, the UK, and the Netherlands continue to experience higher poverty and unemployment than their respective metropolitan countries, despite their constitutional ties to Europe.

Mayotte, France’s poorest overseas department, located in the Indian Ocean, illustrates these disparities. According to France’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), more than 77% of its population of around 320,000 lived below the national poverty line in 2024. Unemployment stood at approximately 30%, rising to 43% among people aged 15–29. Four in five children lived in poverty. In December 2024, Cyclone Chido caused widespread destruction across the island, further straining already limited infrastructure and public services. A 2025 Human Rights Watch report found that thousands of children lived in informal settlements without reliable access to water or sanitation and faced barriers to education.

French gendarmes removing a protesters, Mayotte, 2011 (Photo: Lebelot / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 3.0])

Poverty rates in Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Caribbean, French Guiana on the northeastern coast of South America, and La Réunion in the Indian Ocean are also between two and four times higher than in metropolitan France, according to INSEE. In 2017, France introduced legislation aimed at reducing social and infrastructure disparities between its overseas departments and mainland France.

Comparable challenges exist elsewhere. In the UK’s smaller Overseas Territories, including Montserrat in the eastern Caribbean and St Helena in the South Atlantic Ocean, limited administrative capacity and geographic isolation affect the delivery of public services, and both continue to receive UK development assistance.

The global comparative study of around 40 non-sovereign jurisdictions found that the Dutch Caribbean territories face shortages of specialized professionals in areas such as healthcare and education because of their small populations. Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) are outside the EU single market and do not have access to the regional development funding available to the EU’s Outermost Regions (ORs).

The European Social Charter and overseas territories

The European Social Charter (ESC), adopted by the Council of Europe in 1961, sets out a range of social and economic rights, including access to housing, healthcare, social security, employment protection, and protection from discrimination.

When France ratified the Charter, it chose not to extend it to most of its overseas territories. As a result, they remained outside the Charter’s protections for decades. By contrast, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK had extended the Charter to at least some of their overseas territories.

Hell-Bourg, Réunion (Photo: cercamon / Flickr [CC BY-NC-SA 2.0])

Calls to end the exclusion intensified in 2024, led by the Guadeloupe-based organisation Kimbé Rèd F.W.I., together with the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH). That year, these organisations filed a collective complaint over the long-running chlordecone pollution crisis (*3) in Guadeloupe and Martinique, arguing that it violated residents’ social rights. France argued that the complaint was inadmissible because it had never extended the Charter to most of its overseas territories.

On 19 March 2026, France announced that the Charter would be extended to its overseas departments and regions from 1 May 2026. The decision covers Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Mayotte, La Réunion, Saint-Martin, Saint Barthélemy, and Saint Pierre-et-Miquelon. New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna are not included. Human Rights Watch has noted that extending legal protections alone will not immediately resolve longstanding social and economic challenges in some territories.

Conclusion

The future of Europe’s overseas territories remains diverse and unresolved. While some have expanded self-government or stable constitutional arrangements, others face political disputes, economic inequality, and conflicting visions of self-determination. Recent developments, including France’s extension of the European Social Charter and ongoing negotiations over New Caledonia, show that decolonization remains an ongoing and uneven process rather than a completed chapter of history.