On 8 June 2026, Bangladesh’s Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) said it stopped a push-in (Note-01) attempt from India while similar attempts were reported along other northern border areas. Meanwhile, India maintained that those being removed were undocumented Bangladeshi migrants and accused Bangladesh of delaying nationality verification and repatriation. The incidents took place while BGB and India’s Border Security Force (BSF) were holding director-general-level talks in Delhi, India.

The dispute did not emerge in isolation. Bangladesh is almost surrounded by India, with Indian territory bordering it to the west, north and east. The two countries share a 4,096 kilometer land border, India’s longest international land border, along with 54 common rivers and annual bilateral trade of around US$15 billion. The border region includes communities whose language, kinship networks and local economic ties predate the modern states of India and Bangladesh. These links make the relationship difficult to reduce to formal diplomacy alone.

Relations have faced particular challenges after Bangladesh’s student-led uprising and change of government in August 2024. Visa restrictions, trade measures, border incidents and minority-rights allegations that are in part connected with this change have also added pressure. After Bangladesh’s 2026 election, both governments signaled interest in renewed engagement. However, the same disputes continued to limit that effort.

This article examines why Bangladesh–India relations face a difficult reset in 2026. It places the current strain within the longer history from a shared Bengal and the 1947 Partition to the Awami League–BJP “golden era.” It then examines how the post-2024 political change exposed unresolved disputes over border management, push-ins, water sharing, trade restrictions and energy cooperation.

From a shared Bengal to the “golden era”

The territories on both sides of the present Bangladesh-India border once formed part of the wider Bengal region (Note-2). Bengal was governed under the Mughal Empire before British control expanded in the eighteenth century and the region became part of British India. Between 1905 and 1911, the British divided Bengal for ease of administration, separating its large Bengali-speaking population into eastern and western provinces. By the 1940s, anti-colonial movements had weakened British rule. Britain withdrew in 1947 and divided British India into India and Pakistan. Bengal was also partitioned largely according to the religious majorities of its districts: the Hindu-majority west became the Indian state of West Bengal, while the Muslim-majority east became East Bengal, Pakistan’s eastern wing.

Between 1947 and 1971, relations across the eastern border were shaped by rivalry and wars between India and Pakistan. Political and economic discrimination by West Pakistan against East Pakistan strengthened demands for autonomy, which developed into a movement and then a war for independence. The 1971 war between Pakistan and the Bangladeshi independence movement forced about 10 million refugees to flee to India. India provided humanitarian, diplomatic and military support to the independence movement.

Indian forces during the 1971 capture of Jessore in present-day Bangladesh (Photo: Heinz Baumann / ETH-Bibliothek Zürich / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0)

After Bangladesh became independent, the former East Pakistan–India border became the Bangladesh–India border. Bangladesh’s government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and India’s government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi developed close ties in security, trade and post-war reconstruction. Bangladesh needed support in rebuilding and state building after the war, while India sought a stable and friendly state on its eastern border.

This alignment weakened after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and political power changed in Bangladesh in 1975. After 1975, military-led governments and later the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) reduced dependence on India and expanded ties with China, Pakistan and other Muslim-majority states. India remained concerned about security in its northeastern states, cross-border movement and Bangladesh’s regional partnerships.

Relations improved after Sheikh Hasina, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s daughter and leader of the Awami League (AL), became prime minister in 1996. Relations became more strained after the BNP returned to power in 2001. During this period, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government emphasized concerns that it held with Bangladesh regarding border security, alleged undocumented migration and armed groups operating near its northeastern states.

Relations became much closer after the AL returned to power in 2009. Bangladesh acted against Indian insurgent groups and expanded transit and connectivity. India increased electricity trade, credit and infrastructure cooperation. This further strengthened in 2014 when the BJP returned to power in India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India saw the government in Bangladesh as being supportive in India’s security goals and in facilitating access to its northeastern states. Officials on both sides described this period as a “golden era.”

Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina launch India–Bangladesh bus services in Dhaka in June 2015 (Photo: Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India / Wikimedia Commons / GODL-India)

Post-2024 political change and strained re-engagement

These close relations faced serious challenges after Sheikh Hasina’s government fell in August 2024 following a student-led mass movement against her 15-year rule. Her government had faced criticism over authoritarian governance, disputed elections, repression of opposition forces, restrictions on dissent and heavy reliance on India. Hasina left Bangladesh as protests intensified and entered India seeking refuge. An interim government led by Muhammad Yunus took office on 8 August 2024 to oversee the political transition and prepare the country for an election.

The change also created uncertainty for India. India lost a government that had cooperated closely on security, transit and connectivity. It was also concerned about instability near its eastern border, the safety of Indian citizens and diplomatic staff, and reported attacks on Hindus and other minorities in Bangladesh. India evacuated non-essential diplomatic staff and their families while keeping its missions operational. It repeatedly urged the interim government to protect minority communities. Bangladesh also raised counter-allegations about minority rights in India.

Visa and transport restrictions further limited people-to-people movement. After 5 August 2024, both countries introduced restrictive measures affecting visa services, trade, transport links and ongoing projects. India suspended tourist visas, kept only limited medical, business and double-entry visas, and closed most Indian Visa Application Centres in Bangladesh. Bangladesh also suspended or restricted parts of its visa and project-related engagement with India. These measures made normalization difficult even after both sides later began reopening some services.

During this time, Hasina’s presence in India became a major diplomatic issue. On 17 November 2025, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal convicted her in absentia of crimes against humanity for her role in the violent suppression of the 2024 student-led protests and sentenced her to death. Bangladesh formally requested her extradition, while India said any return would require legal safeguards and due-process guarantees. This extradition dispute further strained relations between the two governments.

Bangladesh held its first post-uprising general election in February 2026, which was won by the BNP. The AL was barred from contesting after its political activities were suspended under the interim government. BNP chairman Tarique Rahman became prime minister and formed a new government. After the election, both Bangladesh and India showed interest in renewed engagement. However, border killings and push-ins, issues surrounding the waters of the Ganges and Teesta rivers, trade restrictions and energy disputes continued to limit that effort.

Protesters clash with police and the army in Dhaka, July 2024 (Photo: Sk Hasan Ali / Shutterstock)

Killings and push-ins along the porous border

Border management has long been a source of tension between Bangladesh and India. The main disputes concern irregular migration, smuggling, border fencing, the use of force and repatriation of people whose nationality is disputed. India views the border as a security challenge because it is used for unauthorized crossings and the movement of cattle, drugs and other goods. Bangladesh, by contrast, has focused on recurring border killings and push-ins carried out without prior notice or the verification of peoples’ nationalities.

The border’s physical and social structure complicates both India’s security enforcement and Bangladesh’s concerns over civilian protection and nationality verification. A 2025 analysis by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) points to several conditions behind this difficulty. Approximately 25% of the border is riverine and cannot be fenced. Shared language, family ties and infrastructure in 164 villages near the boundary further complicate enforcement. The analysis further notes that border touts supply fake Indian identity documents to some irregular migrants, complicating detection even when papers are presented.

Against this background, casualty and push-ins figures from the border remain disputed. Bangladeshi rights group Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK) documented 34 Bangladeshis killed by India’s BSF in 2025 and at least four more in the first four months of 2026.

Bangladeshi border guard data recorded that the Indian BSF pushed 2,479 people into Bangladesh between 7 May 2025 and 26 January 2026. India described them as undocumented Bangladeshi migrants, but Bangladesh claimed that at least 120 were Indian citizens. Later Indian figures varied: the Chief Minister of India’s West Bengal state claimed on 8 June 2026 that about 4,800 people had been sent to Bangladesh and raised the figure to 10,000 on 23 June 2026, while the BSF reported 2,390 deportations since March 2026. The push-ins followed India’s intensified crackdown on undocumented migrants after the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir of India.

At the June 2026 BGB-BSF Director General-level conference, India accused Bangladesh of delaying nationality verification of 2,862 proposed returnees under the 1946 Foreigners Act (Note-03). Bangladesh replied that it had issued travel permits for 634 of those listed and rejected India’s justification, saying delays in verification did not authorize forced transfers and push-ins without prior notice or bilateral procedure.

Human Rights Watch reported that some expulsions involved physical force, confiscation of documents and denial of legal counsel. It also documented cases involving Indian citizens, Rohingya refugees and people with pending citizenship claims and concluded that some removals appeared to target Bengali-speaking Muslims without adequate nationality verification.

Fencing along the India–Bangladesh border in North 24 Parganas, India (Photo: ImSonyR9 / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0)

Water-sharing disputes: the Ganges

Water sharing is another long-running source of tension between Bangladesh and India. Disputes over water volume, allocation rules and dry-season flows have remained politically sensitive. Among the shared rivers, the Ganges and the Teesta remain the most prominent disputes. Smaller rivers, including the Muhuri, Khowai, Gomti, Dharla and Dudhkumar, have also remained under discussion in the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) (Note-04), which Bangladesh and India established in 1972.

Let us first examine the Ganges. The Ganges originates in the western Himalayas in northern India and flows across the Gangetic plain before entering Bangladesh. After crossing into Bangladesh, the river is known as the Padma. Its flow is regulated upstream at the Farakka Barrage, which India commissioned in 1975 in West Bengal, about 18 kilometres from the Bangladesh border.

The barrage was built mainly to divert water into the Hooghly River to flush sediment and maintain navigability at Kolkata Port. Bangladesh has argued that this barrage reduced downstream dry-season flows. It says the reduced flow contributes to salinity intrusion in southwestern Bangladesh, damage to river ecosystems and pressure on agriculture.

The 1996 Ganges Water Treaty established the main framework for dry-season water sharing at Farakka. Signed in New Delhi, India on 12 December 1996, the 30-year treaty applies from 1 January to 31 May each year, when Ganges flows are comparatively low. It divides the available water in ten-day periods using historical flow data recorded at Farakka between 1949 and 1988.

When flows are relatively high, the two countries receive broadly equal shares. When flows fall, the formula guarantees a minimum amount to one country while the other receives the remaining water. During the driest period, Bangladesh and India receive a guaranteed share in alternating ten-day periods. Specifically, from 11 March to 10 May, each country alternately receives 35,000 cusecs (Note-05).

This arrangement has been criticized because, during very low-flow periods, guaranteeing one country a fixed share can leave much less water for the other. One analysis found that this alternating system could therefore intensify shortages rather than distribute them evenly.

The Ganges River and Ganga Barrage in Kanpur, India (Photo: NiteshSingh6789 / Wikimedia Commons / CC0 1.0)

The same study found that Bangladesh often received less water than the treaty guaranteed during the driest period. Between 1997 and 2016, the guaranteed amount was not reached in about two-thirds of the relevant ten-day periods. It also recorded cases in which less water reached Bangladesh than India reported releasing at Farakka. The study noted that upstream use, water losses and differences in measurement may explain part of this gap. India has maintained that it complied with the treaty’s formula.

These implementation concerns have shaped Bangladesh’s position ahead of the treaty’s expiry in December 2026. At the September 2025 JRC Meeting in India, Bangladesh requested a revision of the treaty to guarantee a minimum of 40,000 cusecs. India declined, citing domestic water shortages and state-level political constraints. Renewal therefore remains an unresolved bilateral issue.

Water-sharing disputes: the Teesta

The Teesta dispute differs from the Ganges because no binding water-sharing treaty has been reached. The river originates in the eastern Himalayas, flows through the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal, and enters Bangladesh through the country’s north. Both countries use its water for irrigation. 

India completed a major barrage for the Teesta at Gajoldoba in 1984, but some parts of the canal and distribution network remain incomplete, and construction is ongoing. The project supports irrigation across six districts of northern West Bengal, as well as hydropower and flood control. Bangladesh’s Teesta Barrage Project, completed in 1990, was designed to serve about 750,000 hectares. Both projects therefore depend on limited dry-season flows.

Bangladeshi experts cited by the ORF Bangla platform estimate that Indian upstream dams and canal diversions have reduced dry-season flow from an estimated 6,710 cusecs before the dams were built to between 200 and 1,500 cusecs today. They estimate Bangladesh’s daily requirement at about 5,000 cusecs for irrigation during the dry season. The reported flow therefore amounts to only about 4% to 30% of that requirement. India has not publicly confirmed these figures.

Negotiations over Teesta water sharing began in 1951. In 1983, JRC proposed allocating 39% of the river’s water to India and 36% to Bangladesh, while leaving 25% unallocated. Subsequent negotiations produced a revised proposal. In 2011, the Indian central government prepared an interim agreement allocating 42.5% of Teesta water to India and 37.5% to Bangladesh.

The Teesta Barrage in northern Bangladesh (Photo: Shafiul Islam Shaikot / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY 4.0)

Mamata Banerjee, then Chief Minister of West Bengal, declined to support this proposal, citing the potential impact on farmers in northern West Bengal who depend on Teesta water for irrigation. Under Entry 17 of India’s constitutional State List, water is a state matter. This effectively gives West Bengal a de facto veto power over any central government agreement on Teesta flows. The arrangement was never turned into a binding treaty.

The prolonged stalemate has drawn China into the dispute. After the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024, Bangladesh began to seek Chinese financing for the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, a large-scale scheme involving dredging and flood control works estimated to cost more than US$1 billion.

At a bilateral meeting in Beijing on 25 June 2026, Bangladesh and China agreed to deepen cooperation on the project. India regards China’s involvement with strategic concern, as the project area lies close to the Siliguri Corridor (Note-06). Any resolution of the Teesta dispute still requires India’s agreement, since the river enters Bangladesh from Indian territory. Without a binding dispute resolution mechanism for the Ganges and without any treaty for the Teesta, both rivers remain subject to unilateral upstream decisions.

Trade, energy and accumulated bilateral tensions

Trade disputes also intensified after the 2024 political change. In April 2025, India withdrew a transshipment facility that had allowed Bangladeshi garment exporters to send goods to third-country markets through Indian ports and airports. India justified the decision by citing congestion, delays and higher costs for Indian exporters. Later that month, Bangladesh restricted Indian yarn imports through land ports to protect domestic spinning mills. However, the restriction raised domestic yarn prices by 8% to 12%, increasing costs for its own garment producers.

India followed in May 2025 by barring Bangladeshi garments and several other products at land ports. Garment imports remained permitted through Kolkata and Nhava Sheva seaports, meaning that the measure changed permitted routes rather than imposing a complete import ban. Indian textile producers expected the restriction to increase demand for domestic products, but Indian buyers faced longer delivery routes, higher costs and possible supply disruptions. India’s port restrictions affected a sector central to Bangladesh’s export economy, as ready-made garments account for more than 80% of the country’s export earnings.

The Tamabil land port at the Bangladesh–India border in Sylhet, Bangladesh (Photo: Masum-al-Hasan Rocky / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0)

Energy is a separate but related area of dispute. Bangladesh imports about 1,160 megawatts of electricity from India through cross border arrangements. It also receives electricity from India’s Adani Group under a 25-year power purchase agreement signed in 2017.

A review committee formed by Bangladesh’s interim government found in January 2026 that Bangladesh had been paying approximately 50% more per unit for Adani power than for electricity imported from other Indian suppliers, contributing to losses of up to US$4.13 billion for the state-owned Bangladesh Power Development Board in fiscal year 2024–25. The committee recommended legal action and Bangladesh sought to revisit the agreement. Adani Power maintained that its electricity was competitively priced and urged Bangladesh to clear outstanding dues, which it put at several hundred million US dollars.

A difficult reset, not a breakdown

Bangladesh–India relations are strained but not broken. The post-2024 political change in Bangladesh exposed existing disputes over border management, river sharing, trade and energy that were managed during the Awami League period but not fully resolved. Both governments have since signaled interest in renewed engagement. The next stage will depend on whether these disputes move into formal bilateral mechanisms, rather than remaining tied to the political alignment of governments in Bangladesh and India.

Note-01: A push-in refers to the forced transfer of individuals into a neighboring country without prior notice, nationality verification or bilateral protocol.

Note-02: Bengal refers to the historical and geographical region surrounding the Ganges–Brahmaputra delta, now divided mainly between Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal. Its inhabitants were not a single uniform community, but many were connected through the Bengali language and related regional dialects, river-based transport, agriculture, trade, migration, cultural practices and family networks. These connections developed across areas that later became separated by the 1947 international border.

Note-03: Foreigners Act, 1946: Indian law giving the central government power to regulate the entry, stay and departure of foreigners, including the removal of undocumented foreign nationals.

Note-04: Joint Rivers Commission (JRC): Bangladesh and India established the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission in 1972 to discuss cooperation over common rivers. It followed the 19 March 1972 joint declaration by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indira Gandhi, began functioning in June 1972, and its statute was signed in Dhaka on 24 November 1972. The commission includes representatives from both governments and works on joint study, data exchange, flood control, irrigation and water-sharing issues.

Note-05: A cusec is a measure of water flow. One cusec means that one cubic foot of water passes a fixed point in the river every second. The figures therefore show how quickly water is flowing, not the total amount stored in the river. For comparison, 35,000 cusecs mean about 35,000 cubic feet of water passing each second.

Note-06: Siliguri Corridor: The Siliguri Corridor is a narrow stretch of land in West Bengal that connects mainland India with its northeastern states. It is 200 kilometers long and 20-60 kilometers wide. It lies between Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, and is close to China’s Tibet region. Because major road, rail and military supply routes to India’s northeast pass through this corridor, Indian officials and analysts treat it as a strategic vulnerability. Its location is why Chinese involvement in infrastructure or river-management projects in northern Bangladesh, including near the Teesta basin, draws security concern in India.

Writer: Mohammad Istiaq Jawad