In July 2026, it was announced that what is set to be the biggest trial in Namibian history would be postponed until October. This is one of several delays in the case so far. Ten individuals linked to what is known as the Fishrot scandal are on trial. The scandal centres on allegations of bribery involving Namibian government officials and Samherji, an Icelandic company that is one of Europe’s largest fishing and fish-processing companies. Samherji is thought to have paid large bribes to Namibian officials at the ministerial level in order to secure lucrative fishing quotas in Namibian waters.

The scandal came to light in 2019, when Wikileaks began publishing large quantities of documents and email communications received from a whistleblower in Samherji, who admitted his role in paying bribes. There appears to be copious evidence supporting the allegations. But, assuming the allegations are correct, the Fishrot case was not simply a matter of a corporation willing to pay bribes, and the government officials willing to accept them. The deeds were made possible by a network of shell companies in tax havens around the world, and arguably Norway’s largest bank as well, that appears to have looked the other way in handling the movement of these funds.

This article revisits the Fishrot scandal, with a particular focus on the systemic factors that remain highly relevant in dealings between corporations and governments around the world today.

Walvis Bay docks (Photo: World Bank / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

Namibia’s marine resources and Samherji

Samherji began as a fishing company in Iceland in 1983, but it quickly expanded its operations to cover the entire process of catching fish, processing, and then marketing and exporting seafood. As it grew, it sought fishing grounds and markets far beyond Iceland. Namibia, a country with a relatively small population but a long coastline rich in marine resources, became one of Samherji’s targets.

For decades, Namibia (at the time, known as South West Africa) was subjected to racial segregation and apartheid-style rule under South African, during which its resources were exploited and the profits went to companies in South Africa, among others. An observer noted in 1995 that “little of the value of the resource accrued to Namibia or Namibians”.

In 1990, after a long struggle against South African rule led by the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), Namibia achieved its independence. The new government began replacing foreign ownership in key sectors with local ownership, in a process known as “Namibianization”. Fisheries and marine resources were one sector in which such reforms were made.

In the early 1990s, Namibia began introducing a fishing quota system, by which the government sets a total allowable catch for commercially important types of fish. It then divides this total into quotas, which it awards to individual fishing companies. Until 2019, a large portion of these quotas were allocated to Namibia’s state-owned fishing company, Fishcor, who would then allocate them to individual fishing companies. To obtain quotas, foreign companies like Samherji were required to participate in joint ventures with Namibian-owned corporations.

Chiller room (Photo: International Labour Organization / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

Allegations of bribery

Samherji first bought a quota for fishing rights in Namibia in 2013, obtaining rights to 30,000 tons of horse mackerel. But they wanted more, and worked with figures close to relevant government positions to increase this quota. It is thought that Samherji provided a series of bribes to make this happen. One key vehicle for this was Fishcor, which gave Samherji favourable access to quotas.

In addition, a 2013 bilateral agreement on fisheries between Namibia and Angola appears to have been used to help Samherji to obtain more of Namibia’s fishing quotas. A joint Namibian-Angolan fishing venture called Namgomar SA Pesca was established under the agreement and was given quotas for horse mackerel. Samherji obtained some of these quotas at below-market prices, but then paid additional money to offshore companies whose owners were thought to be intermediaries connected to Namibian government officials. The additional money was seen as a kickback, by which Samherji gave money to government officials in exchange for access to quotas at exceptionally cheap prices.

Over the course of several years, it is estimated that Samherji paid as much as 10 million USD in bribes to Namibian government officials and businessmen. On some occasions, a sports bag with cash in it was handed over. But most of the money was transferred electronically, often using complex and convoluted routes to hide the movement of the money.

The scandal breaks

Jóhannes Stefánsson was the managing director of Samherji’s operation in Namibia from 2013 to 2016, and was involved in arranging the payment of bribes to Namibian officials. He left Samherji in 2016 taking with him statements, emails, payment receipts, invoices, and bank accounts details. He subsequently provided 30,000 of these documents to Wikileaks, a nonprofit media organisation that publishes leaked documents and confidential information from anonymous sources.

A Samherji processing facility on the dock, Dalvik, Iceland (Photo: Steinninn / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY 4.0])

Wikileaks made the documents available on its website, and invited broadcaster Al Jazeera to investigate the material. Additional investigations were launched by The Namibian newspaper, and Iceland’s public broadcaster RÚV, among others. RÚV made its initial broadcast on the issue in November 2019, and Al Jazeera published a documentary program on the issue in December 2019.

In response to the allegations, Samherji issued a statement in November 2019 claiming that it had been unaware of the payments, and that Stefánsson was solely responsible for any illegal activities. CEO Thorsteinn Mar Baldvinsson briefly left his position before returning in March 2020, and Samherji withdrew from Namibia. Samherji was also accused of attempting to intimidate and harass the whistleblower, as well as journalists in Iceland reporting on the scandal.

Meanwhile, in Namibia, former Fisheries Minister Bernard Esau, former Justice Minister Sacky Shanghala, and Fishcor chair James Hatuikulipi were among six people arrested in November 2019 over the scandal. Other were later arrested. Almost seven years later, the case remains in the pre-trial stage.

The role of tax havens

Although most of the alleged bribes paid by Samherji are thought to have be paid electronically, most of the payments were not not made directly to Namibia. Bank transfers in the leaks show money being sent to shell companies in tax havens around the world.

Kickbacks thought to have been paid by Samherji in connection with the Namibian-Angolan joint venture were paid through its subsidiaries to a company registered in Dubai called Tundavala Invest, which was owned by the chair of Fishcor. The payments, which were estimated at 4.1 million USD, were often labelled as “consulting payments”. This was seen as an attempt to launder the money the would subsequently be passed on to certain Namibian government officials.

Cape Cod FS articles of incorporation, Marshall Islands (Screenshot of document published by Wikileaks)

Money transfers linked to the Fishrot scandal passed through a vast network of shell companies and trusts in several other tax havens, including Cyprus, Mauritius, and the Marshall Islands. For example, Samherji transferred large amounts of money to a company called Cape Cod FS, registered in the Marshall Islands. The company was thought to be a front company used by Samherji to route money to other locations.

The use of these offshore jurisdictions was seen, in part, as a way to obscure the transfers so that they would not be linked to Namibian government officials. Tax havens are designed to make it difficult to trace the movement of money as well as the beneficial ownership of the shell companies.

But the use of tax havens also allowed Samherji to use a variety of profit-shifting techniques in order to avoid paying taxes commensurate with their economic activity in Namibia. Documents associated with the Fishrot scandal show that Samherji moved 8.2 million USD internally among its subsidiaries to reduce profits accrued in Namibia, where corporate tax rates are relatively high.

To artificially reduce the profits generated in Namibia, for example, Samherji appears to have sold fish caught in Namibian waters to its own subsidiary in Cyprus (a low tax jurisdiction) at below-market prices. Meanwhile, Samherji subsidiaries in Namibia made large payments to subsidiaries in other tax havens that were ostensibly “service fees”, or royalty payments. Emails show, for example, Samherji’s chief accounting officer discussing “channeling [sic] the royalties derived from our Namibian operation out of Namiba[sic] to Mauritius”. This kind of internal profit shifting helped Samherji reduce the taxes payable in Namibia.

Samherji transactions (Screenshot of DNB bank records, Wikileaks)

Norway’s largest bank, DNB NOR, which was used by Samherji to move money to accounts in tax havens, also became the object of criticism in the aftermath of the Fishrot scandal. One such criticism stemmed from its relationship with the Marshall Islands company Cape Cod FS. The company was a client of DNB for several years, even though the bank did not know who the company’s beneficial owner was.

Furthermore, despite the fact that Samherji made numerous large-scale transactions to other locations considered to be high-risk in terms of money laundering, DNB was accused of neglecting its duty of due diligence. It was reported, for example, that DNB failed to submit any suspicious transactions to the relevant government authorities in Norway regarding payments made to Tundavala Invest in Dubai.

The impacts

Corruption in any sense is, needless to say, problematic. Even in cases of of domestic corruption, in which government officials may take a bribe from a local corporation to award them a contract on favourable terms, for example, the damage is clear. Tax revenue falls, public spending may be distorted, and poverty and inequality can become worse. Public trust in the government also inevitably suffers.

But the international angle of the Fishrot scandal adds a number of other elements to the problem. The collusion of Samherji, a powerful corporation from a high-income country, and high-level political actors in Namibia led to massive amounts of wealth being illicitly extracted from the country.

Fish processing factory (Photo: International Labour Organization / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

Samherji bought fishing quotas from Namibian government officials at below-market prices, which deprived the government of adequate levels of compensation for the exploitation of its resources. This was further compounded by the aggressive tax avoidance schemes employed by Samherji, unfairly reducing the tax bill it was required to pay for the profit it made from the country’s natural resources. Collusion with Fishcor was also problematic, as this state-run company was supposed to allocate some of the money it generated for social programmes.

Furthermore, local fishing companies were unfairly disadvantaged by the quotas Samherji was able access through illicit means. It was reported, for example, that 1,000 jobs were lost at one local company when their quotas of horse mackerel were diverted to Samherji in 2014.

This level of systematic extraction of Namibia’s wealth is all the more concerning given Namibia’s dire economic situation. Colonial rule, followed by apartheid under South Africa has contributed to Namibia having the second worst income inequality in the world (after South Africa). As of 2015, 57% of the population was were living under the ethical poverty line (estimated at around 7.4 USD per person per day).

The amount of money that Namibia has lost as a result of the events associated with the Fishrot scandal is unknown. Namibia’s Financial Intelligence Centre has flagged as suspicious transactions linked to Fishrot worth 650 million USD. This of course does not translate to the amount of money lost, but these figures, combined with the fact that Samherji is thought to have been willing to pay 10 million USD in bribes, do serve as an indication that the scale of the problem is massive.

A new Samherji fishing vessel, 2021 (Photo: Dagvidur / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 4.0])

Past and present?

Almost seven years have passed since the Fishrot scandal broke. What has changed? The prosecution of ten prominent Namibians implicated in the scandal suggests that some degree of accountability is (slowly) being pursued. In the absence of any further delays, the trial of will begin in October 2026.

There has been less accountability for Samherji and its representatives. As of 2026, Samherji is admittedly facing a large-scale lawsuit on behalf of Fishcor, and over 1000 Namibian workers have also submitted claims to prosecutors in Iceland to be recognized as victims of the company. But no representatives of the company have faced prosecution. Meanwhile, Samherji continues to post high profits.

The role played by tax havens around the world in facilitating this kind of illicit exploitation remains massively problematic, with measures to address the issue moving at a painfully slow pace. We don’t know how many other undiscovered ‘Fishrot scandals’ are currently ongoing around the world, but illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is certainly a major problem throughout the African continent. At a systemic level, the weaknesses exposed by Fishrot have not been resolved, leaving the door open to similar abuses in the future.

Writer: Virgil Hawkins