In July 2026, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) announced that it had signed a protocol with the armed group known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), committing the latter to disarmament and demobilisation.

While the group’s name calls for the ‘liberation’ of Rwanda from its current government, the FDLR has been militarily active primarily in the DRC. The Rwandan government has dismissed the protocol. Given its roots in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Rwanda sees the FDLR as a serious security threat, and a group that has collaborated with the DRC government. It asserts that a US-brokered deal signed in 2025 between the DRC and Rwanda calls requires neutralization of the FDLR, not negotiation with it.

The FDLR is just one of dozens of non-state armed groups active in the DRC, and the FDLR is only one point of contention between the DRC and Rwanda. Nor is Rwanda the only country with security concerns in the DRC. It is after all a country roughly the size Western Europe, and shares borders with nine other countries.

This article aims to provide an overview of the conflict in the DRC.

Rebel soldier (Photo: Steve Evans / Flickr [CC BY-NC 2.0])

Conflict background

The DRC’s eastern borders, particularly those with Rwanda and Burundi and Uganda, have long been a focal point of migration, interaction, and tension. Waves of migration of people from Rwanda to what is now the eastern DRC, for example, date back to pre-colonial times. After the borders were drawn and independent states formed, people with similar ethnic identities remained on both sides of the borders. Over the years, the mix of ethnic identities and migration resulted in clashes over who has a right to be a citizen, who has a right to the land, and who has access to political power.

In 1993, mass killings broke out in Burundi, and the following year, genocide occurred in Rwanda. In both of these cases, the killings were carried out along ethnic lines, and both served to exacerbate existing tensions in the region. The Rwandan genocide saw perpetrators of the genocide flee together with refugees from Rwanda to eastern DRC (then known as Zaire). Some of these perpetrators would go on to form the FDLR.

Citing the threat posed by the militarization of the refugee camps, the post-genocide government in Rwanda invaded its neighbour in 1996. Uganda and Burundi, among others, joined Rwanda, and, together with local rebels, advanced across the country. They toppled the government the following year, and Zaire was renamed the DRC.

Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were dissatisfied with the new government they had helped to install in the DRC. They invaded again in 1998. This time the DRC government was joined by Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad and Namibia, and within a short space of time, seven foreign militaries were fighting on Congolese soil. The parties fought to a stalemate that left the country effective split in half, with the east of the country under the control of foreign occupying forces and local rebel groups. Given the scale of the conflict, and its international nature, the conflict came to be called Africa’s First World War.

A peace agreement was eventually achieved and foreign forces completed their withdrawal in 2003. While this removed direct foreign involvement, a host of local armed forces remained active in the DRC, fighting against the DRC government, and at times with each other. Some of these groups, with foreign backing, have been able to push back government forces and take over large portions of territory. Others can be seen as local self-defence militias that formed in the power vacuum left by eroding government power and presence. Some of these militias ally themselves with government forces.

Key non-state armed groups

The most powerful non-state armed group in the DRC is the March 23 or M23 Movement. Like the FDLR, the M23 is also closely linked to Rwanda, but the two forces are on opposite sides. The FDLR was originally dominated by people identifying as belonging to the Hutu ethnic group, and in strong opposition to the post-genocide government in Rwanda. The M23, on the other hand, is considered to be made up largely of people identifying as Tutsi, and the group firmly allies itself with the government in Rwanda. While the FDLR appears to be on the verge of surrender, the M23, which re-emerged from relative inactivity in 2021, has become a powerful force on the DRC’s eastern border.

The group has evolved through a number of iterations. Before becoming the M23, the group was a dominant force in the region known as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Since re-emerging, it has taken control of much of North and South Kivu, including their provincial capitals. The M23 is backed by Rwanda, and thousands of Rwandan troops are thought to be on the ground in the DRC. In 2023 the M23 joined with nine other armed groups to form the Congo River Alliance (AFC).

A number of other armed groups hold territory or influence, in varying degrees, in eastern DRC. A group known as the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), for example, is active primarily in the north-east region of Ituri. It fights with government forces, and more recently, has clashed with a rival faction called the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CRP), which emerged in late 2025. Another armed group active in the area bordering the DRC and Uganda, is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an extremist group linked to numerous attacks against civilians.

Humanitarian issues

Thirty years of conflict has severely exacerbated what was already a dire humanitarian situation in the DRC. The beginning of the conflict marked the end of decades of authoritarian rule under Mobutu Sese Seko, during which most of the country was left underdeveloped. Before that, the country experienced devastating and severely exploitative colonial rule under Belgium and its king.

Displaced people, North Kivu, 2012 (Photo: MONUSCO, Sylvain Liechti / Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 2.0])

A a result, even in areas under government control that have managed to avoid the conflict, funding for public services and infrastructure remain limited, and poverty is deeply entrenched. In areas that have face conflict, the situation is far worse. An epidemiological study covering just the first nine years of conflict (1998-2007) estimated that the death toll from the conflict was roughly 5.4 million. This would make it the deadliest conflict in the world since the Korean War. The vast majority of these deaths were caused by sickness and starvation linked to the conflict. There have been no attempts to count the death toll since.

Large-scale displacement, and lack of access to food and health care, remain at crisis levels. As of late 2025, it was estimated that 1.2 million Congolese were refugees in neighbouring countries, and an additional 5.8 million were displaced within the country. As of 2026, more than 26.6 million people in the country are thought to be experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity, with 1.35 million children suffering from severe acute malnutrition.

Humanitarian suffering by civilians is not simply a by-product of conflict – in many cases civilians are actively targeted by armed groups. Massacres are frequently reported, and abduction, torture, and sexual violence are rampant.

The DRC’s humanitarian crisis has been further compounded by an outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2026. The outbreak is the fastest-growing on record, and as of August, more than 4,000 cases and 2,000 deaths had been confirmed. Dealing with this outbreak puts greater strain on already stretched health services.

Economic issues

Although the vast majority of the DRC’s population faces abject poverty, the country holds much wealth. The east of the country, where much of the conflict is concentrated, provides fertile ground for agriculture, and beneath the ground lies large quantities of valuable minerals. Such minerals include tantalum, tin, and tungsten, as well as gold – known as the 3TGs – which are used in industries surrounding electronics and military hardware, among others.

Cassiterite (Photo: Enough Project / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

In the context of the DRC, these minerals are frequently labelled “conflict minerals”. Armed groups fight to take control of the mines where such minerals are found, as well as the routes that are used to transport them out of the country. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi are thought to benefit from minerals originating in the DRC. For non-state armed groups, minerals provide the income needed to arm and support their movements. For state actors, control of the mines may provide revenue for the government, but it may also serve to enrich corrupt officials.

Even if they are not in direct control of the mines, armed groups levy taxes on the organizations and individuals engaged in mining. This forms part of a broader system of informal taxation by armed groups in the territory they control, which may be as simple as setting up checkpoints on roads the groups control and collecting fees or taxes.

Foreign interventions

Although the major international aspects of the conflict in the DRC were seen between 1998 and 2003, the DRC today remains host to a variety of foreign armed forces.

United Nations peacekeepers have been in the DRC since 1999. Initially deployed as the UN Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC), at its peak troop levels exceeded 22,000 personnel. It transitioned in 2010 to the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO), with approximately 10,000 troops currently deployed. Although these are ostensibly neutral peacekeepers, they are aligned with DRC government forces, and jointly participate in military operations against some non-state armed groups.

Peacekeepers on patrol (Photo: United Nations / Flickr [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0])

The DRC has also hosted regional forces that provide military support to the DRC government. Previously, an East Africa Community Regional Force (EACRF) had been active in the east of the country, but unmet expectations led to the deployment being brought to an end in late 2023. By the time these forces withdrew, the DRC government welcomed a force from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) was deployed in December 2023, comprised of troops from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania.

Three of the DRC’s neighbours are also thought to have troops on the ground in the DRC. As already noted, it has been reported that Rwandan troops are in the DRC in support of the M23 rebels, although Rwanda officially denies this. Uganda and Burundi have also troops deployed in the DRC, but unlike Rwanda, these troops have entered with the permission of the DRC government. Uganda is pursuing ADF rebels that threaten both the DRC and Uganda, while Burundi is targeting rebels from Burundi that are based in the DRC.

Some argue that the re-emergence of the M23 in 2021 can be linked to rivalry between Rwanda and Uganda. The entrance of Ugandan troops into the DRC in 2021, as well as strengthened cooperation on building roads in the DRC was seen as a threat by Rwanda, and this may have prompted renewed intervention under the guise of a M23 re-emergence.

Bukavu and Lake Kivu (Photo: Omri Eliyahu / Shutterstock.com)

Is there an end in sight?

Conflict in the DRC has been the object of a variety of mediation efforts in recent years. The African Union (AU) has engaged in mediation, and the organization’s Peace and Security Council has been used as forum to discuss ways to move the peace process forward. In 2025 the AU combined its efforts with those of regional bodies EAC and SADC.

Mediation attempts have also been made by individual countries, namely Angola, Qatar and the US. As noted at the outset, US mediation led to an agreement between DRC and Rwanda in 2025. But in 2026, the fighting between the DRC military and the M23 continues unabated.

Thirty years have passed since conflict began in the DRC. When it will end remains to be seen.

Writer: Virgil Hawkins

Graphic: Mohammad Istiaq Jawad